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Abstract
We study a two-country setting in which leveraged investors generate fire-sale
externalities, leading to financial crises and contagion. Governments can affect the
incidence of financial crisis and the degree of contagion by injecting public liquidity
and, additionally, by segmenting the countries’ liquidity markets. We show that
segmentation allows a country to avoid contagion and fend off mild financial crises
caused by a small shock to its liquidity demand, at the cost of exposing it to more
severe financial crises caused by a large shock. We derive a “pecking order” re-
sult, whereby segmentation is a second-best measure that coordinated governments
should use only when tax capacity constrains them from injecting liquidity. Even
when segmentation is welfare-enhancing, it should be applied to public liquidity
alone, never restricting the free flow of private liquidity across countries. Uncoordi-
nated governments tend to use segmentation excessively.
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that fire sales by a high-leverage financially-distressed in-
vestor, such as a bank or a hedge fund, localized in one market, may create a negative
contagion effect for other investors localized in other markets: see, for example, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008), Holmstrom and Ti-
role (2011) or Kuong (2015).1 The implication is that liquidity shocks may spread into
connected markets, be amplified and trigger a financial crisis. It is therefore tempting to
stipulate that segmenting the market to less connected, stand-alone units may contribute
to financial stability and enhance social welfare. This argument is regarded as particu-
larly relevant to the design of international financial architecture, and has recently gained
support from policy-oriented authors, such as Haldane (2009), or Ostroy et. al. (2016).
It is implied that although integrated financial markets bring about some benefits such
as better diversification of risk, these benefits are of a second-order magnitude compared
with the welfare cost of financial crisis.
Stiglitz (2010) summarizes this view succinctly: “with convex technologies and concave
utility functions, risk sharing is always beneficial...But if technologies are not convex, then
risk sharing can lower expected utility...While simplistic models typically employed in
economics assume convexity, the world is rife with non-convexities.”
To illustrate, Stiglitz (2010) introduces a simple example, which we slightly adapt
as follows: there are two symmetric countries, A and B, each facing a random liquidity
shock, θ ∈ {θh, θl}, high or low respectively, with independent realizations across the two
countries. If the markets are integrated, both countries suffer a financial crisis once the
combined shock exceeds a threshold θ∗. If the markets are segmented, then each country
suffers a crisis if its own shock exceeds θ
∗
2
. Stiglitz considers the θh shock an extreme
event so that
θh − θ
∗
2
>
θ∗
2
− θl > 0, (1)
implying that θh + θl > θ∗. It follows that an h realization in one country is sufficient
to push both into crisis: contagion. In contrast, once the markets are segmented each
country suffers a financial crisis only if it draws the θh realization.2 It follows that the
switch from segmentation to integration increases the probability of crisis. Assuming that
1The above literature focuses on contagion through fire sale externalities. Other sources of contagion
may be direct credit exposure (Allen and Gale, 2000), wealth effects (Kyle and Xiong, 2001), or portfolio
constraints (Pavlova and Rigobon, 2008). See also Davila and Korinek (2018) for a useful taxonomy of
financial frictions that may generate financial amplification.
2Note that the same example can generate a diversification benefit from integration when θh + θl <
θ∗. This is reminiscent of Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), who show that the shock
propagation properties of a network structure depend on the distribution of underlying shocks. They
show that a network that allows effective diversification when negative shocks are small can turn into a
fragile network when negative shocks are large.
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crisis is costly, integration decreases welfare, unambiguously.
The above example has obvious limitations. To see why, consider, first, the case where
there is a third intermediate shock, θm, above θ
∗
2
but small enough that θl + θm < θ∗.
Under segmentation, country A is out of crisis whenever its own shock is mild (θl) and in
crisis whenever its own shock is sufficiently severe (either θm or θh). Under integration,
A suffers from contagion and slips into crisis when its own shock is mild, but B′s shock
is high
(
θl, θh
)
. However, A may now be rescued from crisis when its own shock is severe
(θm) and B′s shock is mild (θl). Integration therefore reshuﬄes realizations across crisis
events, lifting A out of crisis some of the time when its shock is severe (θm), at the
expense of exposing A to contagion when its shock is mild (θl). The effect on the ex ante
probability of crisis is ambiguous, but even if it stays the same, there is no reason to
believe that such a reshuﬄing of crisis states is welfare neutral, except for the knife-edge
case where the social cost of crisis is independent of the magnitude of the underlying
shock. Second, if θ is interpreted as related to the demand for liquidity, then θ∗ must be
related to its supply. Liquidity may be supplied, privately, by profit-seeking speculators,
or by welfare maximizing governments or, jointly, by both. Either way, θ∗ should be
endogenized, which would determine its position relative to various realizations and place
the entire analysis on a more solid footing. Third, since governments inject liquidity
and implement segmentation policies, welfare maximization should consider both policy
instruments simultaneously. We show that accounting for the three points above has far
reaching implications.
We construct a model with two countries, each having a population of risk-neutral
investors, profit-seeking speculators who provide private liquidity and welfare maximizing
governments that can inject liquidity, levy taxes and segment liquidity markets. Each
investor has access to a single scalable project. Investors have only a limited endowment
so that scaling up the project requires leverage. The use of debt contracts is fully endog-
enized. Investors are exposed to a “maintenance” shock, which we interpret as financial
distress (see Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). The fraction of distressed investors is θ, itself a
continuous random variable, constituting a macro shock that is independent across coun-
tries. Leverage implies that distressed investors are forced to fire-sell a fraction of their
projects, thereby creating demand for liquidity. Applying “cash in the market” modelling
(see Allen and Gale, 1994), the supply of liquidity, L, is endogenously determined by gov-
ernments and speculators before the macro shock θ is realized. L determines a threshold,
θ∗, such that a realization of θ in excess of θ∗ results in a discontinuous drop of the fire-sale
price, with contagion effects running within each country and, to the extent that markets
are integrated, across countries. Governments choose their policies before speculators de-
cide on their liquidity supply. That way, total liquidity supply and the probability of crisis
are endogenized. Since investors’ losses are not fully internalized by speculators, there is
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an under-provision of liquidity in a competitive equilibrium; liquidity is a public good.
That situation may motivate governments to inject some extra liquidity and, at the same
time, to consider segmentation policies to limit the incidence of cross-country contagion.
The governments have no advantage of information, nor can they write contracts that
private agents cannot write. The only reason why the governments can deploy effective
policies is their ability to levy taxes (below, we argue that segmentation is akin to a tax),
which allows them execute “unprofitable” trades and, thereby, internalize social values
that private traders ignore.
The analysis reveals that segmentation has an inherent disadvantage. While the policy
reduces the incidence of contagion, it also blocks liquidity outflows from a country with
surplus liquidity that, in some circumstances, can prevent a crisis in the neighboring
country that is experiencing a liquidity shortage. On the upside, by blocking contagion,
segmentation can fend off a crisis, but only when the shock is mild so that domestic
liquidity is sufficient to absorb all fire sales. On the downside, by blocking liquidity
inflows from abroad, segmentation exposes a country to crisis when the domestic shock is
severe (and the foreign shock is mild) so that domestic liquidity is insufficient to absorb all
fire sales. It follows that segmentation tends to trade off a mild financial crisis for a severe
one (see the reshuﬄing argument in the extended Stiglitz example, above). While this
trade-off is generic, welfare accounting must weigh the equilibrium incidence of severe and
mild shocks in crisis. As a result, there are cases where segmentation is welfare-enhancing.
Our micro-founded model allows us to fully characterize these cases.
Three major insights emerge. First, it is never optimal to put any restrictions on the
free flow of private liquidity. The reason is simple: the fundamental market failure in our
model is that the competitive supply of liquidity is sub-optimal. The injection of public
liquidity, subsidized by taxation, is always (locally) optimal at the competitive equilib-
rium. Segmentation operates similar to a tax that undermines the profitability and, thus,
the supply of private liquidity. As a public good, liquidity should be subsidized, not taxed.
Note that the injection of such subsidized public liquidity does crowd out private liquid-
ity. Once the tax constraint is sufficiently relaxed, it is optimal to inject sufficient public
liquidity to fully crowd out private liquidity. However, as long as speculators participate
in the supply of private liquidity, it is never optimal to restrict their participation through
segmentation.
The second result is akin to a “pecking order”: coordinated governments (who maxi-
mize the joint welfare of the two countries) should inject liquidity first and segment only
when tax capacity constrains them from injecting more liquidity. Supplying a public good
– liquidity – should be the governments’ preferred course of action as long as they have the
tax capacity to do so. More accurately, we show that for any combination of structural
parameters, there exists a sufficiently high level of tax capacity such that the segmentation
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of publicly injected liquidity is sub-optimal. A necessary condition for a welfare enhanc-
ing segmentation policy is that the tax constraint binds. In that case, segmentation can
sometimes reduce the crisis probability and, thereby, increase welfare. Segmentation is
an imperfect substitute to liquidity injection, a dominated course of action that should
be used only when the preferred course of action is constrained.
The third insight is that there is (weakly) more segmentation in the Nash equilib-
rium where the governments fail to coordinate their policies ex ante. The reason is sim-
ple: absent coordination, each government internalizes the advantage of segmentation by
avoiding liquidity outflows, but ignores the welfare loss it inflicts on its neighbour. Inter-
estingly, this result is reminiscent of the old “beggar-thy-neighbour” effect as discussed,
for example, by Stiglitz (1999).
Our assumptions with respect to the fire-sale market, the pivot of our theoretical
analysis, are supported by a substantial body of empirical work. For example, Pulvino
(1998) and Campbell et. al. (2011) document fire sale discounts in the airline and the
real estate markets. Ellul et. al. (2011) follow Coval and Stafford (2007) in extending the
results to financial assets.3 International finance applications tend to focus on emerging
markets, c.f. Jotikasthira et. al. (2012) or Schnabl (2012), but recent events point
towards wider relevance. For example, Mink and de Haan (2013) show that European
banks experience abnormal returns around news events concerning Greece even when the
banks had no direct exposure to Greek debt, consistent with the presence of contagion
effects.4
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a liquidity injection
of $125 bn on October 13, 2008, by the US treasury to buy assets from ten distressed
US banks.5 The cost to the US taxpayer – the expenditure ($125 bn) net of the value
of the assets obtained in return – is between $21 bn and $44 bn. The benefits are esti-
mated through the price impact that the policy had on the enterprise value of the banks,
particularly their subordinated debt, totalling $130 bn. Since the benefits also accrue to
US taxpayers, the policy was welfare-enhancing. It is worth noting that the above is an
ex post welfare calculation (conditional on financial crisis), while we execute an ex ante
welfare calculation, which also includes the opportunity cost of liquidity out of crisis and
the governments’ capacity to bear that cost.6
3See Duffie (2010) for a survey and a tentative explanation for why capital flows respond “slowly” to
liquidity shortages.
4Based on simulation analysis, Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) argue that financial globalization signif-
icantly increased international spillovers due to the effect that asset price declines during crisis have on
banks’ balance sheets internationally.
5For other studies of public liquidity injections, see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen’s (2015)
analysis of large asset purchase programmes. Interactions between public and private liquidity are exam-
ined in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, (2013).
6See Acharya et. al. (2014): sovereign default risk appears to increase following the bailout of private
banks, indicating that capacity for bailout is indeed restricted.
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Our paper makes a contribution to the limits-of-arbitrage literature, in particular the
part that deals with welfare and policy; see Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a compre-
hensive survey. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) study an economy with dynamic risk-averse
investors and arbitrage traders who are constrained by margin requirements. The authors
find that “arbitrage activity benefits all investors ... [albeit] competitive arbitrageurs could
... fail to take a socially optimal level of risk”. Gromb and Vayanos (2018) generalize the
framework in several important dimensions and characterize the dynamics of arbitrage
capital towards a steady state. Caballero and Simsek (2017) present a three-period model
with a continuum of countries. Like us, they identify both the upside and downside of
capital inflow. Our analysis shares with that literature the notion of segmentation. The
main difference is that we treat segmentation as a policy instrument rather than a struc-
tural friction of the financial system. As such, we emphasize the crucial interrelations
between segmentation and other policy tools, such as liquidity injections.
There is a developed, more applied, theoretical literature on the relationship between
international capital flows and financial crisis: see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001,
2003, 2004), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), Mendoza (2010) or Lorenzoni (2014)
for an overview. Policy analysis in the form of Pigouvian taxes or capital controls are
explored by Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Korinek (2010), Korinek (2011), or Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2015).7 In a banking context, Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, and Lorenzoni
(2017) focus on the question of how integration affects liquidity supply and show that
it may reduce banks’ liquidity holdings. Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) execute a wel-
fare analysis of a two-country model with risk averse agents and Diamond-Dybvig (1983)
banks. Macro shocks have a perfect, negative correlation so that the joint endowment
is non-random. Direct diversification is possible, but is constrained by a moral hazard
problem. Integration dominates segmentation, even when it fails to deliver the first best.
The model is not designed to address the discontinuous nature of crisis, as highlighted by
Stiglitz (2010) among others.
Another branch of the literature explores international policy coordination.8 Bengui
(2014) studies a two-country model with risk-averse agents. Liquidity hoarding provides
an imperfect substitute for state contingent contracts. Uncoordinated regulation may
result in an equilibrium with under-provision of liquidity. Kara (2016) derives similar
results in a setting where the insurance motive is shut down as the two country shocks are
perfectly correlated. In our model, liquidity injection plays a similar role to liquidity reg-
ulation above, but the interaction between segmentation decisions and injection decisions
7Korinek (2016) provides an analysis of international spillovers and policy coordination in a very
general framework. We differ in that we allow for amplification to introduce non-convexities into the
production frontier.
8Policy coordination is also the subject of a literature on regulatory competition: see Acharya (2003),
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Morrison and White (2009).
5
is shown to be critically important.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Equi-
librium and welfare in the single-country benchmark are analysed in Section 3. The
two-country equilibrium is described in Section 4. Section 5 derives the joint segmenta-
tion/injection optimal policy when countries coordinate, and Section 6 studies the Nash
equilibrium when countries choose policies without coordinating. Section 7 concludes.
Throughout the paper, we refer to an online Appendix with several extensions.
2 The setting
There are four periods, t = 0, 1, 2, 3 and two countries, i = A,B. Each country has a
measure-one continuum of investors, numerous speculators and a government that cares
about the welfare of its own citizens.9 All agents are risk-neutral and discount future
consumption using a unit factor. There is a storable consumption good, the numeraire of
our model, which we label “cash” to facilitate economic interpretation. The net return
from storing cash is zero in all periods. In period 0, investors have a cash endowment, w.
Speculators’ cash endowments are sufficiently large so as not to impose binding constraints
in equilibrium. The governments have no endowment.
Investors, speculators and governments can invest in an illiquid technology, such that
1 unit of cash invested in period 0 yields ρ > 1 units of cash in period 3. It is not possible
to invest in the illiquid technology after period 0, nor is it possible to convert it into
cash before period 3. We take ρ to be the opportunity cost of hoarding cash (supplying
liquidity) in period 0 and denote by Li its amount in country i.
Each investor (but not speculators or governments) has access to a scalable “project”.
In period 0, cash investment in the project is converted, one-to-one, into productive
assets. This technology is irreversible: productive assets cannot be converted back to
cash. Productive assets fully depreciate by the end of period 3. The scale of the project,
measured in terms of productive assets, is denoted by k. If an investor wishes to operate
at a scale exceeding his initial endowment, he will have to raise external funds, b, so that
k ≤ w + b.
In period 1, a measure θi of investors are affected by “financial distress” modelled
as follows: A non-distressed investor generates cash flows y2 and y3 per unit of asset, in
periods 2 and 3, respectively. A distressed investor generates cash flows y2 and γy3 per unit
of asset, 0 < γ < 1, unless he injects extra cash, m > 0 per unit of asset, to “maintain”
his project; see Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). The word “maintenance” should not be
taken too literally; it can imply, for example, extra costs of operating the business or
9It is assumed that speculators reside and abide by the regulations of either country A or B, an
assumption that implies no loss of generality.
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higher than expected start-up costs. θi, is a random variable, uniformly distributed on
[0,Θ], with a zero correlation between θA and θB.
In period 1 investors can “fire sell” a fraction λ of their productive assets. The fire
sale market is competitive and the fire sale price of a productive asset (in terms of cash)
is denoted by q . We make the standard assumption that assets are less productive in the
hands of a new owner due to, say, project specific human capital.10 Hence, the buyer’s
period 3 cash flow drops to δy3 per unit of asset, 0 < δ < 1, if he bears the cost of
maintenance, m, and γδy3 otherwise. We assume, for simplicity, that second period cash
flows are not affected by an ownership change. Maintenance creates value:
m < δ (1− γ) y3. (2)
It is easy to see that if condition (2) holds, the original owner can generate even more
(social) value by investing in maintenance.
The aggregate (predetermined) amount of cash available in period 1 is denoted by L.
It comprises both private and public cash left over from period 0 after investments in
projects and the illiquid technology have been made. We refer to L as liquidity.
Projects are opaque to providers of external funds. Hence, they cannot contract on any
project-specific contingency such as cash flows, maintenance work, scaling or descaling of
the project. It is also impossible to tag specific units of assets. The no-tagging assumption
excludes, by an arbitrage argument similar to Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), any scheme
to purchase distressed productive assets at a price other than the market price, q. At
the same time we do allow contracts contingent on the macro shock, θi. In particular,
we allow agents to issue securities contingent on q (in equilibrium, a function of θi), for
example by writing put options on assets.
Providers of external finance can commit to punish default on contractual payment by
project shut down. While the threat of “bankruptcy” can be effective in the enforcement
of period 2 payments it cannot enforce period 3 payments, because at that point the
assets’ value is zero. Hence, all period 3 cash flows accrue to the investor as “rent” while
period 2 cash flows can be pledged to the lender. Since equilibrium contracts include such
penalty clauses (see below), we interpret external finance, b, as “debt”. Notice that the
combination of debt and a put option can be interpreted as debt indexation.
Under the above assumptions “investors” lend themselves to a banking interpretation.
Banks’ portfolios and cash flows are notoriously opaque. Due to “off the balance sheet”
operations, even the scale of the portfolio is often unknown. The no-tagging assump-
10We assume, however, that governments are as effective as private buyers in operating assets bought
on the fire sale market. When governments are less effective than private buyers at managing assets,
the value of injecting public liquidity drops, with second-order implications on incentives to segment /
integrate markets (see online Appendix).
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tion fits financial assets. Our bankruptcy penalties capture actions such as revoking an
operating license or barring directors from future managerial positions.
Governments have two policy instruments. First, they can borrow cash from specu-
lators in period 0 to be injected in period 1 into the fire sale market. Second, they can
impose restrictions on cross-border liquidity outflows – segmentation policies. The policy
mix of segmentation and injection is decided and announced simultaneously by the two
countries in period 0, before the realization of θi and before speculators and investors
make their choices.11 Each government is committed to its announced policy. Since gov-
ernments have no cash endowment to begin with, any liquidity that is set aside in period 0
must be funded by borrowing. Government debt is repaid through period-3 taxes, levied
on the investors.12 To capture the convex nature of tax distortions, we assume that lump
sum taxes can support borrowing up to an amount G (same for both countries), but
distortions prohibit any borrowing beyond that point.
As for segmentation policies, governments may prohibit the flow of liquidity out of the
country.13 The policy is binary: the facility through which liquidity flows out is either
open or shut. The policy applies to both private and public liquidity. When the facility
is open, liquidity providers, private as well as public, are still allowed to set aside some
liquidity for domestic use only.
We make four parametric assumptions.
A1 : ρ <
y2 + δy3
y2 +
m
1−γ
implies that the opportunity cost of liquidity, ρ, is sufficiently low to motivate speculators
to provide it. Notice that inequality (2) is implied by A1.
A2 : ρ > y2 + δy3 −m
implies that the opportunity cost of funds is sufficiently high to guarantee finite project
11The assumption is motivated by the observation that restrictions on capital flows take a long time to
implement. Empirical work by Fernandez et al. (2014) is consistent with the assumption: “we find that
capital controls are remarkably acyclical”. For analytical completeness, we study the ex post optimal
allocation of liquidity in the online Appendix.
12That is, although investors’ period 3 rents are are not pledgeable (because lenders cannot verify their
income at the individual level), they can be taxed by the government (at least as a group, say, by a tax
on their anonymised purchase of consumption goods). Alternatively, we could assume that governments’
operations are funded by a tax on speculators, in a manner that might affect the tax incidence but not
the welfare analysis of our model (including the algebraic expressions below).
13In our model, governments have no reason to block inflows (unlike in some of the literature where
capital controls can serve to curb excessive borrowing, e.g., Jeanne and Korinek, 2010, or Korinek, 2011).
Consistent with our assumption, Fernandez et. al. (2015) find that most capital controls are on outflows
rather than on inflows.
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size.
A3 : y2 + δy3 −m < γy3
implies that even conditional on financial distress, the project can still generate sufficient
rent to make repayment incentive compatible. Finally,
A4 : ρ ≤ y2 + y3
1− Θ
2
(1− γ)
1 + Θ
[
(1−γ)y3
m
− 1
]
guarantees that investors optimally borrow up to their debt capacity and hence fund a
maintenance shock through fire sales. The parameter space as defined by assumptions A1
to A4 is non empty; see footnote 15 below.
3 The single-country benchmark
In this section we derive the single-country benchmark. For brevity, we omit the country
index, i, throughout this section. Let R be the constant debt repayment. We stipulate
that under the optimal contract:
Conjecture 1. i) Debt repayment, R, is supported by a bankruptcy clause, is constant,
and is determined by the lender’s participation constraint:
R = bρ. (3)
ii) All period 0 funds, both internal and external, are invested in the productive asset:
k = b+ w. (4)
iii) Projects are “leveraged up to the limit” defined by the available period 2 cash of
non-distressed investors:
R = y2k. (5)
Proposition 1 below demonstrates that this contract and the implied investors’ policies are,
indeed, optimal. Intuitively, investors fully repay their debt in order to avoid bankruptcy
that would result in losing their period-3 rent (part i). Parametric assumption A3 implies
that default is a dominated strategy: the investor could sell the project at date 1 at a
maximum price (y2 + δy3 −m) k and then default at date 2, in which case he loses the
payoff from carrying on with a damaged project, γy3k.
14 Debt repayment is constant: the
14Note that A3 also implies that the investor would not want to sell an intact project and then default.
9
opacity assumption prevents the investors from writing contracts contingent of the event
of their own project’s distress. Moreover, if assets are exchanged in period 1, it must be
at market prices as any other arrangement would open up an arbitrage opportunity (see
also Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). Our assumptions allow to index repayments on the
observable macro shock, θ, which would provide only an imperfect hedge against project
distress, but are not used in equilibrium. The reason is related to part ii) of Conjecture
1: all of period 0 financial resources are invested in productive assets. It is not in the
investor’s best interest to hoard cash or buy securities that would generate cash in high-θ
states, such as call options on assets. Doing so would provide some (imperfect) insurance
against project distress, but that would come at the expense of decreasing project size
and, thus, rents. See also Tirole (2006) for a discussion of the insurance-scale trade-off.
Part iii) states that the scale of the project is constrained by period 2 pledgeable income
which is all used for debt repayment.
Using (3)-(5) we solve for the project’s scale:
k = w
ρ
ρ− y2 , (6)
which is bounded by parametric assumption A2.
Since, by part iii) of Conjecture 1, investors scale their projects up to their debt
capacity, the only resource available to fund maintenance is the period-1 fire-sale of a
certain fraction, λ, of productive assets. Since a downsized project generates less cash,
and since it is still optimal to avoid bankruptcy, investors need to fire sell in period 1
in excess of the maintenance cost, and carry the remaining cash forward in order to pay
period 2 debt. The combined periods 1 and 2 budget constraint is, thus:15
λqk + (1− λ) y2k = (1− λ)mk +R. (7)
We solve for λ:
λ (q) =
m
q +m− y2 . (8)
Equation (8) already conveys the contagion effect: the lower is the fire sale price, q, the
more assets the distressed investor needs to fire sell.
Ex post equilibrium prices are determined by the market clearing condition,
L ≥ θη (q +m)λ (q) k, (9)
where η is the fraction of distressed investors who fire-sell assets. Hence, in period 1,
predetermined liquidity, L, should be sufficient to absorb fire sales by θη investors, each
15To see that the difference λqk − (1− λ)mk is positive, use equations (5) and (6) to solve out R as a
function of w and substitute in equation (8).
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selling a fraction λ of k-sized projects. Each unit of asset takes q units of cash to buy
and, then, m units of cash to maintain. A full characterization of the ex post (period 1)
equilibrium is given as follows:
Proposition 1. For any amount of liquidity, L, there is a cut-off point, θ∗, such that
a period 1 realization, θ, maps into events, s ∈ {n, c}, normal times and crisis times
respectively, with fire-sale prices:
q (θ) =
qn = y2 + δy3 −m, if θ ≤ θ∗qc = y2 + γ1−γm, if θ > θ∗ , (10)
qn > qc and
θ∗ =
L
(qn +m)λnk
. (11)
When s = n , the market clearing condition (9) holds with strict inequality, implying a
slack in liquidity and η = 1. When s = c, the market clearing condition (9) holds with
equality and η < 1; distressed investors are indifferent between carrying out and avoiding
maintenance. Conjecture 1 describes the optimal (debt) contract, in equilibrium.
Proof. qc is determined by investors’ indifference about maintenance: γy3k = [1− λ (qc)] y3k.
Let D (q, θ) ≡ (q +m)λ (q) kθ, which is increasing in θ and decreasing in q. qn is deter-
mined by “fundamental” cash flows. Define θ∗ such that D (qn, θ∗) = L. For any θ ≤ θ∗,
D (qn, θ) ≤ L (with strict inequality except for θ = θ∗), so that at qn the market-clearing
condition (9) is satisfied with η = 1. For any θ > θ∗, D (qn, θ) > L so that there is
insufficient liquidity to absorb all the fire sales at a price of qn. Obviously, D (qc, θ) > L
so, at a price qc the market clearing condition (9) can only be satisfied with η < 1. Notice
that θ∗ is the highest possible realization of θ for which a no-crisis equilibrium exists. To
solve for θ∗ substitute , q = qn and η = 1 into the binding market clearing condition (9).
For the optimality of the policy in Conjecture 1, see Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates. For q > qc, the demand for liquidity is described by the graph
of the D function, as defined in the proof of Proposition 1, given a θ′′ realization. As
mentioned above, the negative slope captures contagion: the lower the fire sale price is,
the greater λ is, the fraction of productive assets that distressed investors need to sell
and, hence, the greater the demand for liquidity is. When the fire sale price drops to
qc, investors become indifferent between carrying out and avoiding maintenance. Hence,
at that price the demand for liquidity “bends backwards” and becomes flat, as investors
are willing to sell any amount in [0, D (qc, θ′′)]. (There is no rationing in the conventional
sense). As for the supply of liquidity, buyers of fire sale productive assets do not pay
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more than qn, the “fundamental” price, and at period 1 cannot supply more liquidity
than L. Hence, the supply curve is also decreasing in price, comprising a single step. It
follows that given θ′′, the equilibrium price is qc and η < 1. Generally, in crisis and across
θ realizations, the number of distressed investors who obtain funding to maintain their
projects is a fixed proportion, µ, of θ∗:
θη = θ∗µ, µ ≡ λ
n (qn +m)
λc (qc +m)
< 1, (12)
to be used below.
Given a lower magnitude shock, say θ′, graphed by the dashed line in Figure 1, the fire
sale price is qn and the slack in liquidity at qn guarantees that all fire sales are absorbed at
a price of qn, so that all the distressed investors obtain funding to maintain their projects,
η = 1.
Between θ′ and θ′′, multiple equilibria may arise, in which case we select the (Pareto
dominating) qn on grounds that the government can, at no cost, coordinate expectations
to that price; see Kuong (2015) for a related point. Clearly, in between, there is a unique
threshold, θ∗, beyond which the only intersection is at the crisis price, qc.
Similar to other models of its type, ours captures the dead weight loss of financial crisis:
given a certain θ, crisis implies a lower fire-sale price so that investors who maintain their
projects need to liquidate a larger fraction in order to obtain the necessary funding. But
then, the greater is θ, the more distressed investors there are and the greater the intensity
of the crisis is, which plays a pivotal role in our analysis. Moreover, our model captures
an amplification effect of crisis, such that fire-sales prices drop discontinuously around a
threshold level. This captures precisely the “non-convexity” in the production function
that, according to Stiglitz (2010), turns the usual risk-sharing benefits of integration into
a cost of contagion.
A buyer of an asset on the fire sale market earns, ex post, a gross rate of return of
r = y2+δy3
q+m
. It follows that speculators make no profit in normal times, rn = 1, but since
rc =
y2 + δy3
y2 +
m
1−γ
> 1, (13)
they do in crisis.
The θ∗ threshold determines the probability of crisis, denoted by Ψ (θ∗), as follows:
Ψ (θ∗) = 1− θ
∗
Θ
. (14)
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The ex ante expected gross rate of return on liquidity is, therefore:
E (r) = [1−Ψ (θ∗)] rn + Ψ (θ∗) rc. (15)
Absent government intervention, liquidity is supplied by profit-driven speculators.
Competition drives E (r) down to the opportunity cost of liquidity, ρ, so that the specu-
lators break even. The competitive probability of crisis is, therefore:
Ψe =
ρ− 1
rc − 1 . (16)
Let θe be the corresponding crisis threshold, Ψ (θe) = Ψe, and let Le be the competitive
supply of liquidity, derived by applying θe to equation (11). Notice that a strictly positive
probability of crisis is part of the normal functioning of such an economy; otherwise, the
speculators have no incentive to supply any liquidity. See Allen and Gale (1998), Gorton
and Huang (2004) or Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2013) for a similar result.
Next, we turn to the analysis of the government’s injection policy:
Proposition 2. Let LG be the government’s injected liquidity. If LG ≤ Le the probability
of crisis is Ψe and private liquidity supply is Le−LG. If LG > Le the probability of crisis
is smaller than Ψe and private liquidity supply is 0.
Proof. Immediate using parametric assumption A1.
Public liquidity injections below a level of Le are ineffective as they merely crowd
out, one-for-one, private liquidity supply, with no effect on the total supply of liquidity.
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Above Le, private liquidity supply is fully crowded out, because the government’s injected
liquidity drives the crisis probability below the speculator’s break-even point.
Next, we derive the welfare function. Notice that regardless of the amount of liquidity
that the government injects, the speculators earn the same rate of return on their wealth,
ρ, including the case when they are fully crowded out. Moreover, since both the govern-
ment’s and the speculators’ cost of liquidity is the same, ρ, welfare can be written as a
function of total liquidity, regardless of the extent of speculators’ participation.
The social welfare function can be derived in two ways: either by looking at a project’s
output or by looking at investors’ income. Starting with the former, we can formulate
total output as a function of the shock θ, and the resulting state of the economy, s ∈ {n, c}.
In the hands of a non-distressed investor, period-3 production per project is pu = y3k,
regardless of s (period 2 output is always fully used in order to compensate the lenders,
so we can ignore it here). In the hands of a distressed investor, the 1− λs fraction that is
maintained produces (y3 −m) k; the rest is transferred to second-best users who generate
only (δy3 −m) k. Hence, the production of a project owned by an investor who invests
in maintenance is psd = (1− λs) (y3 −m) k + λs (δy3 −m) k. But then, in crisis (s = c),
only a fraction η of distressed investors maintain their projects. The others produce just
γy3k. Note that crisis entails an efficiency loss via an increase in λ for all the distressed
investors’ projects. As we will see below, this also implies that the welfare loss due to
a crisis is increasing in the number of distressed investors, θ.16 From output we need to
subtract the opportunity cost of supplying liquidity L, which is L (ρ− 1).
We can now write
W (θ∗) =
∫ θ∗
0
[(1− θ) pu + θpnd ]
dθ
Θ
(17)
+
∫ Θ
θ∗
[(1− θ) pu + θηpcd + θ (1− η) γy3k]
dθ
Θ
− L (ρ− 1) .
Alternatively, investors’ rent, yu = y3k, is the same whether the economy is in financial
crisis or not. In contrast, distressed investors’ rent, ysd = (1− λs) y3k, λs ≡ λ (qs), is crisis
related as λc > λn. But due to the indifference result in Proposition 1, in crisis, distressed
investors’ rent, ycd, is the same whether they maintain their projects or fail to do so and,
as a result, is independent of η. Expected trading profits, net of the opportunity cost of
supplying liquidity, are given by Ψ (θ∗) (rc − 1)L−(ρ− 1)L and are lump-sum transferred
16This is an important deviation from the special case considered by Stiglitz (2010) whereby the cost
of crisis is independent of the underlying shock. It is possible to provide a micro-foundation for that
special case, for example, in a bank run model in which the shock triggers a run, but does not itself affect
welfare conditional on a run occurring (see Allen and Gale, 1998).
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back to the investors. Hence, the welfare function is
W (θ∗) =
∫ θ∗
0
[(1− θ) yu + θynd ]
dθ
Θ
+
∫ Θ
θ∗
[(1− θ) yu + θycd]
dθ
Θ
(18)
+Ψ (θ∗) (rc − 1)L− (ρ− 1)L.
The two derivations of welfare in equations (18) and (17) are equivalent, but are useful
in producing different interpretations of the forces that operate in our model. Defining
Y ≡ ∫ Θ
0
[(1− θ) yu + θynd ] dθΘ and using Ψe from equation (16) we can rewrite welfare as
W (θ∗) = Y −
∫ Θ
θ∗
θ∆
dθ
Θ
+ [Ψ (θ∗)−Ψe] θ∗Γ,
where
∆ ≡ pnd − γy3k = (λc − λn) y3k =
1
δ
[δ (1− γ) y3 −m] k > 0,
Γ ≡ µ (pcd − γy3k) = λn (qn +m) k (rc − 1) = µ [δ (1− γ) y3 −m] k > 0.
and µ is defined in equation (12), above; ∆ and Γ are expressed first in terms of project
output, second in terms of rent, and third, directly in terms of model parameters.
Compute the derivative
W ′ (θ∗) =
θ∗
Θ
(∆− Γ) + Γ [Ψ (θ∗)−Ψe] . (19)
Next, we define the government’s liquidity-injection capacity,
θ∗G =
G
(qn +m)λnk
, (20)
and state the basic welfare result of our analysis:
Proposition 3. Liquidity is under-supplied in a competitive equilibrium. Provided that
it has the capacity to do so (
θ∗G
Θ
> 1 − Ψe), the government’s optimal policy is to inject
liquidity in excess of the competitive amount, θ∗ > θe, which results in a full crowding
out of private liquidity. If, in addition, ∆ > 2Γ then optimal liquidity supply is given by
the corner solution θ∗ = θ∗G. If the government cannot fully crowd out the competitive
liquidity supply (
θ∗G
Θ
≤ 1 − Ψe), it is (weakly) optimal for the government not to supply
any liquidity.
Proof. W ′ (θe) > 0 as ∆ > Γ due to parametric assumption A1. Using (14) it is clear that
W (θ∗) is a convex function iff ∆ > 2Γ. The rest follows from the feasibility constraint
(20) and Proposition 2.
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Competitive equilibrium, even in the single country case, is socially inefficient: W ′ (θe) =
θ∗
Θ
(∆− Γ) > 0. The root problem is project opacity. Had financial distress been observ-
able, investors could write contingent insurance contracts that would funnel in the cash
for maintenance work, making the fire-sale market redundant. That W ′ (θe) > 0 implies
an externality that makes liquidity a public good, under supplied in a competitive equilib-
rium. That externality is made of two parts: the “∆ effect” emerges because speculators
fail to internalize that, by injecting extra liquidity, they can “lift” the threshold state,
θe, out of financial crisis, thereby decreasing the loss of rent for θe distressed investors
from λcy3k to λ
ny3k. The “Γ effect” corrects for the fact that investors’ valuation of the
private cost of crisis is in excess of the social cost of crisis as they fail to internalize that
the fire sale price, qc, is lower than the “fundamental value” per unit of productive asset,
qn. That difference is captured by the speculators in the form of trading profits; it is
easy to show that L (rc − 1) = ηθλc (qn − qc) k. A project efficiency interpretation can
be developed in parallel, emphasizing the efficiency losses generated when a shortage of
funds prevents some investors from maintaining their projects.
The term θ
∗
Θ
(∆− Γ) implies increasing returns to liquidity: the larger the amount of
injected liquidity is, the larger the threshold, θ∗, is, so that more distressed investors are
affected, on the margin, by the injection of more liquidity. As we move away from the
competitive equilibrium, Ψ (θ∗) no longer equals Ψe, and the extra term Γ [Ψ (θ∗)−Ψe]
in equation (19) must be taken into consideration. This situation introduces decreasing
returns to scale in liquidity because expected capital gains, Ψ (θ∗) (rc − 1)L, are shaped
as a Laffer curve, generating zero gains when either L is zero, or when it is sufficiently
high to drive the probability of crisis to zero. The net effect on the second derivative,
W ′′, is therefore ambiguous and depends on the sign of ∆− 2Γ.17
4 Two countries: ex post equilibrium
Let Li,D, Li,T and Li,F be country i’s segmented (i.e., available for domestic use only),
total and free-flowing liquidity, respectively: Li,T ≡ Li,D + Li,F . Let L ≡ LA,T + LB,T
and LF ≡ LA,F + LB,F be the world’s total and free-flowing liquidity, respectively. As
in the single-country case, it is convenient to map these variables into the state space,
dividing Li,D, Li,T , LF , and L, by (q
n +m)λnk, to derive thresholds θ∗i,D, θ
∗
i,T , θ
∗
F , θ
∗ and
θ∗G, respectively:
θ∗i,D =
Li,D
(qn +m)λnk
,
17Parametric assumptions A1−A4 are consistent with ∆ ≷ 2Γ as illustrated by the following numerical
examples. For y2 = 0.25; y3 = 2; γ = 0.4; δ = 0.5; m = 0.5; Θ = 0.6; ρ = 1.05, we have ∆ > 2Γ, while
for y2 = 0.1; y3 = 2; γ = 0.4; δ = 0.6; m = 0.55; Θ = 0.6; ρ = 1.05, we have ∆ < 2Γ.
16
etc. In fact, four numbers are sufficient to describe the world’s liquidity configuration; we
find the vector θ∗ =
(
θ∗A,D, θ
∗
B,D, θ
∗
A,T , θ
∗) most convenient. We define the set of feasible
liquidity configurations, L:
L = {θ∗ ∣∣0 ≤ θ∗i,D ≤ θ∗i,T , θ∗ ≤ 2Θ} , (21)
where 2Θ is the highest possible realization of the joint shock, θA + θB.
We can now characterize the ex post equilibrium:18
Proposition 4. Given a pre-determined liquidity configuration, θ∗, and a realization of
shocks (θA, θB), country A can avoid a financial crisis (and sustain a fire-sale price of q
n)
if:
i) θA ≤ θ∗A,D, (regardless of θB);
or ii) θA > θ
∗
A,D, and θA ≤ θ∗A,D + θ∗F and θA + θB ≤ θ∗A,D + θ∗B,D + θ∗F .
Otherwise, country A suffers a financial crisis and the domestic fire sale prices drop
to qc. An analogous characterization applies to country B.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we use D (q, θ) ≡ (q +m)λ (q) kθ. Then, country
A can avoid financial crisis if its own segmented liquidity is sufficient, D (qn, θA) ≤ LA,D,
regardless of the situation in country B (case i). When country A’s liquidity is not
sufficient, D (qn, θA) > LA,D, country A can still avoid financial crisis by drawing on
free-flowing liquidity D (qn, θA) ≤ LA,D + LF , provided that the world’s total liquidity is
sufficient to satisfy the joint demand of both countries A and B: D (qn, θA)+D (q
n, θB) ≤
LA + LB + LF (case ii).
Figure 2 illustrates. Realizations in cases i) are captured by rectangle θ∗A,D×Θ, while
case ii) expands the no crisis area to points below the downward sloping diagonal θ∗
to θ∗ up to θA = θ∗A,D + θ
∗
F . Superimposing crisis realizations in both countries reveals
four possible regimes: no crisis in either country, “systemic crisis” in both countries, and
regional crisis in either country A or B, denoted by areas NC, SC, RC−A and RC−B,
respectively.
A few technical steps are required before we proceed with our welfare analysis. When
θ∗ > Θ the regional crisis area, RC − B, is empty for θ∗A,D < θ∗ − Θ because, for any
realization θA < θ
∗−Θ, there is sufficient liquidity in the system to support country B out
of crisis even if θB is realized at its upper bound, Θ. Any configuration with θ
∗
A,D < θ
∗−Θ
is equivalent in all respects to the configuration θ∗A,D = θ
∗ − Θ. The same is obviously
true for θ∗B,D. Hence, we can restrict attention to the “relevant area”, defined as LR ⊆ L:
LR ≡ {θ∗ ∈ L ∣∣θ∗i,D ≥ θ∗ −Θ} . (22)
18Note that the optimal financial contract remains unchanged because contractual insurance opportu-
nities are not improved in the two-country case.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regimes
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For realizations θA ∈
(
θ∗A,D, θ
∗
A,D + θ
∗
F
]
, whether country A ends up in financial crisis
depends on country-B’s realization, θB, which already indicates the presence of cross-
country contagion. Hence, define country-A’s probability of financial crisis, conditional
on the realization of its own shock, θA, and given a liquidity configuration within the
relevant area, θ∗ ∈ LR, by the function ψA (θA;θ∗), as follows:
ψA (θA,θ
∗) ≡ Pr (qA = qc |θA ) =

0 for θA ∈
[
0, θ∗A,D
]
,
1− θ∗−θA
Θ
for θA ∈
(
θ∗A,D, θ
∗ − θ∗B,D
]
.
1 for θA ∈
(
θ∗ − θ∗B,D,Θ
] (23)
An analogous19 definition applies to countryB. Figure 2 illustrates: for a θA ∈
(
θ∗A,D, θ
∗
A,D + θ
∗
F
]
,
the values of ψA are represented by the length of the vertical line between Θ and the θ
∗-
to-θ∗ diagonal, at θA, divided by Θ.
We can now derive the ex ante probability of a crisis in country i for any liquidity
configuration θ∗ ∈ LR,
Ψi (θ
∗) ≡ Pr (qi = qc) =
∫ Θ
0
ψi (θi)
dθi
Θ
, (24)
and the probability of crisis in either of the two countries,
19With the slight asymmetry that in ψA (θA;θ
∗) the first (second) element in θ∗ denotes the country’s
own (neighbour) segmented liquidity and in ψB (θB ;θ
∗) the order is reversed.
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ΨA∨B (θ
∗) ≡ Pr (qA = qc ∨ qB = qc) = ΨA (θ∗) +
∫ Θ
θ∗B,D+θ
∗
F
ψB (θB;θ
∗)
dθB
Θ
(25)
= 1− 1
2
[(
θ∗
Θ
)2
−
(
θ∗A,D
Θ
)2
−
(
θ∗B,D
Θ
)2]
.
Notice that since ψA is defined over the relevant area, the functions that are derived from
it are also defined over the relevant area. Due to its important role, we state the following
straightforward result:
Corollary 1. ΨA∨B (θ
∗) > Ψi (θ
∗): the probability of crisis in country A, for example, is
strictly smaller than the probability of crisis in either country A or in country B, unless
the regional crisis areas, RC − A and RC −B are both empty.
To execute the welfare analysis of Sections 5 and 6, we derive the ex ante welfare
function of country A:
WA (θ
∗) = Y −
∫ Θ
0
ψA (θA;θ
∗) θA∆
dθA
Θ
+ Γ
[
θ∗A,DΨA(θ
∗) +
(
θ∗A,T − θ∗A,D
)
ΨA∨B (θ
∗)
]
− LA,T (ρ− 1) . (26)
For reasons already articulated in the derivation of the single-country welfare function
(18), the notation need not distinguish between private and public liquidity, nor is it
necessary to include the speculators in the welfare calculus. That being said, there are
circumstances in which segmented or free-flowing liquidity can be supplied only privately
or only publicly. The analysis of these cases makes the identity of the supplier perfectly
clear, without further burdening the notation; see below. When analyzing the joint welfare
optimum we focus on country A welfare as a function of a symmetric change in policies
in countries A and B. Since countries are symmetric, this is the same as analyzing the
effect of the policy in A on the sum of welfare in A and B.
The top line in equation (26) captures the ∆ effect, that is, the loss of rent or produc-
tivity across different realizations of θA due to financial crisis, relative to a base level, Y .
The second line captures the Γ effect, that is the lump sum transfer of the government’s
capital gains back to the investor population or, alternatively, the enhanced efficiency for
the η fraction of projects which are maintained. The third line captures the opportunity
cost of liquidity.
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5 Two countries: welfare analysis with coordinated
governments
Figure 2 already provides the basic intuition that drives our analysis. Consider a policy
that replaces a fully integrated market, where all liquidity can flow freely between two
countries, with a partially segmented market where the amounts
(
θ∗A,D, θ
∗
B,D
)
are restricted
for domestic use only; total liquidity, θ∗, is fixed across the policy switch. Clearly, such
segmentation ex post benefits country A in some circumstances: when it is affected by
a shock that is sufficiently mild so that it can be accommodated by domestic segmented
liquidity, θA < θ
∗
A,D, yet country B is hit by a severe shock that could spread out via
contagion and drag both countries into crisis had the markets been integrated, θA + θB >
θ∗. (The argument applies to points above the θ∗-to-θ∗ diagonal and to the left of the
θ∗A,D vertical.) In sharp deviation from standard neo-classical models, the equalization of
asset prices across countries is no longer a necessary condition for economic efficiency. In
an online Appendix we provide a comprehensive analysis of the ex post state contingent
segmentation policies.20
An ex ante welfare analysis must account for the fact that a policy of segmentation can
undermine countryA’s welfare in other circumstances: when it is affected by a severe shock
that cannot be deflected using segmented and free-flowing liquidity, θA > θ
∗
A,D + θ
∗
F , yet
country B is hit by a shock mild enough so that had the two countries been integrated, the
total liquidity would suffice to rescue both from crisis, θ∗A,D + θ
∗
B,D < θ
∗. (The argument
applies to points below the θ∗-to-θ∗ diagonal and to the right of left of the θ∗A,D + θ
∗
F
vertical.) Crucially, the upside of segmentation affects only small θA realizations, while
the downside affects large θA realizations. Hence, segmentation “buys” country A relief
from a mild crisis at the cost of exposing it to a severe crisis.
The argument above is made from the point of view of countryA, under the assumption
of symmetric reciprocity by country B. In particular, country A can collect the benefits
from integration only to the extent that country B removes the restrictions on the outflow
of θ∗B,D in return for country A lifting the restrictions on the outflows of θ
∗
A,D. Such
reciprocity assumes coordination. The result is equivalent to a “central planner” who
maximizes the joint welfare of both countries with respect to θ∗A,D = θ
∗
B,D, and, in the
comprehensive version of the analysis, below, θ∗ as well. That is, we evaluate the net
benefit of segmentation in terms of avoiding contagion in some states and increasing
20That is, we relax the assumption that segmentation policies take a long time to implement and,
hence, must be decided before the realization of [θA, θB ]. Interestingly, the optimal policy has a triage-
like property in that liquidity is segmented towards the country hit by the most severe shock, provided
that the country can be rescued; otherwise, segmented liquidity should be directed towards the lesser
affected country. Again, the assumption that the social cost of crisis is increasing in the magnitude of
the shock plays a pivotal role in the argument.
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exposure to crisis in others, as well as the net benefit of reducing the overall incidence
of crisis through public liquidity injections. As in the single-country case, governments’
ability to inject liquidity depends on their tax capacity. We proceed with the analysis
by distinguishing three cases: i) when the governments have no capacity to inject any
liquidity (G = 0); ii) when the governments’ capacity is sufficiently high to fully crowd
out all private liquidity; and iii) when the governments have an intermediate capacity
so that they can only crowd out some, but not all private liquidity. Section 5.4 brings
together the results from the three cases.
5.1 Zero tax capacity,
θ∗G
Θ = 0
Having no liquidity injection capacity, the only policy decision that the governments have
in the G = 0 case is whether to leave the facility through which private liquidity can
flow out of the country open or closed. Consider the case where both countries coordinate
a policy of segmentation. Clearly, this case reduces to that of two isolated countries,
each with a supply of private, segmented liquidity of θe and an ex ante probability of
financial crisis Ψe as derived in Section 3. Denote by θ∗S the corresponding liquidity
configuration, that is,
(
θ∗A,D, θ
∗
B,D, θ
∗
A,T , θ
∗) = (θe, θe, θe, 2θe). Alternatively, consider the
case where both governments allow a free flow of liquidity. Speculators provide liquidity
up to the break-even point so that the liquidity configuration is θ∗F =
(
0, 0, θ∗A,T , θ
∗
F
)
, such
that ΨA∨B (θ
∗
F ) = Ψ
e. Note that θ∗A,T is immaterial to the determination of θ
∗
F , which
is uniquely determined regardless of the allocation of free-flowing liquidity between the
speculators of country A and those of country B.
It follows that country A’s (and B’s) probability of financial crisis is not affected by the
governments’ segmentation policies: ΨA (θ
∗
S) = ΨA (θ
∗
F ) = Ψ
e. Hence, although the policy
does redistribute (θA, θB) realizations across crisis and no-crisis events, on the balance of
probabilities (but not welfare!) segmentation is neutral: the measure of realizations that
the policy switch rescues from crisis must be equal to the measure of realizations that it
draws into crisis. Equation (27), which plays an important role in the proof of Proposition
5 below, provides a formal statement; we express the equality ΨA (θ
∗
F ) = ΨA (θ
∗
S) in terms
of integrals over ψA (θA;θ
∗
F ) and ψA (θA;θ
∗
S), which we split at the point θA = θ
e and then
rearrange:∫ θe
0
[ψA (θA;θ
∗
F )− ψA (θA;θ∗S)]
dθA
Θ
=
∫ Θ
θe
[ψA (θA;θ
∗
S)− ψA (θA;θ∗F )]
dθA
Θ
. (27)
Since ψA (θA;θ
∗
S) equals zero (one) to the left (right) of θ
e, the RHS (LHS) of the equation
captures the upside (downside) of segmentation in terms of decreased (increased) crisis
probability. The two sides of the equation correspond to the two equal-area shaded
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Figure 3: Two countries, G = 0, free flow versus segmentation, Ψe > 1
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Proposition 5. When governments have no tax capacity (G = 0) so that all liquidity is
supplied competitively by speculators, it is optimal for the governments of countries A and
B to coordinate a policy that allows private liquidity to flow freely.
Proof. Note that under either configuration θ∗F or θ
∗
S the expected return on liquidity is
just ρ so that the second and third lines of the welfare function (26) cancel each other.
Splitting the integration of WA at θ
e,
WA (θ
∗
F ) = Y −
∫ θe
0
ψA (θA;θ
∗
F ) θA∆
dθA
Θ
−
∫ Θ
θe
ψA (θA;θ
∗
F ) θA∆
dθA
Θ
,
using the fact that ψA equals to zero (one) to the left (right) of θ
e,
WA (θ
∗
F ) = Y −
∫ θe
0
[ψA (θA;θ
∗
F )− ψA (θA;θ∗S)] θA∆
dθA
Θ
−
∫ Θ
θe
[ψA (θA;θ
∗
F ) + 1− ψA (θA;θ∗S)] θA∆
dθA
Θ
,
and the fact that θe is an upper (lower) bound on θA to the left (right) of θ
e yields
21Point (θe, θe) lies below (above) the diagonal when θ∗F is smaller (greater) than Θ.
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WA (θ
∗
F ) > Y − θe∆
{∫ θe
0
[ψA (θA;θ
∗
F )− ψA (θA;θ∗S)]
dθA
Θ
−
∫ Θ
θe
[ψA (θA;θ
∗
S)− ψA (θA;θ∗F )]
dθA
Θ
}
−
∫ Θ
θe
θA∆
dθA
Θ
.
Using (27), we conclude
WA (θ
∗
F ) > Y −
∫ Θ
θe
θA∆
dθA
Θ
= WA (θ
∗
S) .
An analogous argument applies to country B.
The intuition is straightforward. A policy of segmentation is neutral in terms of
probabilities. Nevertheless, segmentation is dominated in terms of welfare. Although it
prevents crises by avoiding contagion, this is only possible for relatively mild shocks, as
country A has only its own liquidity to fend off a crisis. On the other hand, segmentation
exposes country A to crises by denying it access to its neighbour’s liquidity. In other
words, precisely when a shock is too intense to be handled by the country’s own liquidity,
segmentation denies it the chance of being rescued by drawing on its neighbours liquidity.
Hence, segmentation trades off severe financial crises for equal-probability mild financial
crises. This trade-off is pivotal in the welfare analysis below, even for the cases where G
no longer equals zero.
Although Proposition 5 is derived under the specific assumptions of our model, we
believe that the argument is more general. For example, we assume, for tractability, that
cash flows, y2, γy3, and δy3 as well as the maintenance cost m are independent of θ. This
assumption renders fire sale prices {qn, qc} invariant across realizations within the {n, c}
events. In general, cash flows, prices and ex post rates of return on liquidity could vary
with the shock. As a result, the speculators’ break even condition (16) may have a more
complicated structure so that the policies are no longer probability neutral. Nevertheless,
our basic trade-off is likely to survive as long as the social cost of crisis is increasing in the
magnitude of the shock. That is, segmentation blocks contagion but leaves countries to
their own devices; hence, it contributes to welfare when the shock is small. At the same
time, segmentation also blocks liquidity inflows; it therefore undermines welfare when the
shock is too large to be accommodated by domestic resources alone.
Another general point worth making is that free flow of liquidity may welfare domi-
nate segmentation despite the fact that it brings about perfect correlation in crisis inci-
dence across countries. There is a tendency to assign welfare values to empirical findings
that document increased correlation under integration, particularly in times of crisis; c.f.
Londono (2016), Das and Uppal (2004) or Longin and Solnik, (2001). By itself, crisis
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correlation has no welfare implication. Our analysis suggests greater caution in drawing
welfare interpretations from plain correlations.
5.2 Full crowding out (
θ∗G
Θ ≥
√
1−Ψe)
Consider, next, the other extreme case where the governments have a sufficiently high tax
capacity, G, so that they can crowd out the entire supply of private liquidity. Notably,
even when the governments keep the facility through which liquidity flows across countries
open, they can still decide to segment the market by allocating some of their liquidity
for domestic use only, a decision which they will make, announce and commit to, ex
ante. In this case, Corollary 1 still holds: segmented liquidity bears a lower rate of return
than free-flowing liquidity, but the governments, which are not motivated by profit, can
ignore the “arbitrage opportunity” if it serves their welfare objectives. Hence, unlike
in the G = 0 case, we can no longer restrict the analysis to the corners of full or zero
segmentation. Technically, each government makes a policy decision with respect to two
continuous variables: the total amount of liquidity that they inject, θ∗i,T , out of which
they segment the amount θ∗i,D for domestic use only. The rest, θ
∗
i,T − θ∗i,D, can flow freely.
To execute the analysis, we compute the partial derivatives of WA using (24), (25) and
(26):
∂WA (θ
∗)
∂θ∗A,D
= Γ
θ∗A,D
Θ
[(
1− θ
∗ − θ∗A,D
Θ
)(
∆
Γ
− 2
)
+
(
θ∗A,T − θ∗A,D
)
Θ
]
, (28)
∂WA (θ
∗)
∂θ∗A,T
= Γ (ΨA∨B −Ψe) , (29)
∂WA (θ
∗)
∂θ∗B,D
= −Γθ
∗
B,D
Θ
[
∆
Γ
θ∗ − θ∗B,D
Θ
− θ
∗
A,T
Θ
]
, (30)
∂WA (θ
∗)
∂θ∗
= ∆ (1−ΨA∨B) + Γ
[(
θ∗A,D
Θ
)2
−
(
θ∗A,T
Θ
)(
θ∗
Θ
)]
. (31)
For the rest of this section we focus on the symmetric case, whereby θ∗T ≡ θ∗A,T = θ∗B,T and
θ∗D ≡ θ∗A,D = θ∗B,D denote the country level symmetric total and segmented liquidity, re-
spectively, so that the generic liquidity configuration in this case is θ∗M = (θ
∗
D, θ
∗
D, θ
∗
T , 2θ
∗
T ).
To find the critical tax capacity that allows the governments to drive the crisis proba-
bility below its competitive level (if they wish to do so) we substitute equation (25) into
ΨA∨B (θ∗G, θ
∗
G, θ
∗
G, 2θ
∗
G) ≤ Ψe and solve out θ
∗
G
Θ
≥ √1−Ψe.22 Section 5.3 completes the
analysis by focusing on the parameter region where
θ∗G
Θ
<
√
1−Ψe.
22Note that full crowding out requires a higher tax capacity than in the single-country case. This is
because public liquidity is segmented, while private liquidity is free to flow across two countries. For
a given level of public liquidity, private liquidity therefore earns a higher rate of return than in the
single-country case and hence more public liquidity is needed to drive out private liquidity.
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Proposition 6 states the welfare result for the full crowding out case. Since the technical
detail of the argument is somewhat tedious, we accelerate the discussion by deferring the
formal proof to Section 5.2.1 below, providing here only the outline of the argument
together with the basic intuition:
Proposition 6. For
θ∗G
Θ
≥ √1−Ψe, it is optimal for the governments of countries A and
B to coordinate policies such that: i) Private liquidity is fully crowded out. ii) There is
full segmentation if
∆
Γ
> 2 and
θ∗G
Θ
≤ 3
8
∆
Γ
− 2
∆
Γ
− 3
2
, (32)
and zero segmentation otherwise. iii) If θ∗G > θ
R, where θR < Θ is given by (37) below,
then the optimal amount of liquidity injection is below tax capacity and always features
zero segmentation.
Proof: see section 5.2.1, below.
Given symmetry, the social welfare function, WA (equation (26)), has only two effective
arguments (policy instruments): liquidity injection, θ∗T , and segmentation, θ
∗
D. (With a
certain abuse of notation we keep the symbol WA to denote welfare as a function of θ
∗
T
and θ∗D, once substituted into the vector θ
∗
M .) The welfare manifold is concave in θ
∗
T and
reaches a maximum inside the relevant area when ∆
Γ
< 1 + Ψ
e
2
and is otherwise increasing
in θ∗T over the entire relevant area; it is decreasing in θ
∗
D when
∆
Γ
≤ 2 and is otherwise
convex in θ∗D reaching minima inside the relevant area. Figure 4 illustrates using arrows
to indicate the direction in which welfare is increasing in the θ∗T and θ
∗
D dimensions,
and the
_
θ T and
`
θD curves to collect maxima and minima (if they exist) in the θ
∗
T and
the θ∗D dimension, respectively; see Section 5.2.1 for full detail. Remember that WA is
defined over the “relevant area” as defined by the LR set. It is represented by the shaded
triangle in Figure 4, so that θ∗D varies from full segmentation, θ
∗
D = θ
∗
T , to the lower bound
θ∗D = max (0, 1− 2θ∗T ) as defined in equation (22). Since welfare is invariant in θ∗D below
that lower bound,23 we call all (θ∗T , θ
∗
D) points on the lower bound “zero segmentation”,
even if θ∗D > 0.
Figure 4 also plots a ΨA∨B = Ψe, which collects pairs of 1Θ (θ
∗
T , θ
∗
D) such that the
probability of crisis is Ψe. For subsequent use we compute:
dθ∗D
dθ∗T
∣∣∣∣
ΨA∨B(θ∗M)=Ψe
= 2
θ∗T
θ∗D
> 1 (33)
(see Section 5.3 for more intuition). The curve intersects with the upper bound of the
relevant area at
θ∗T
Θ
=
√
1−Ψe, to the right of which lies the full crowding out region.
23See discussion of equation (22) above.
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Figure 4: Welfare manifold
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Part i) of Proposition 6 extends the single-country result of Proposition 3 to the two
country case, i.e., if tax capacity allows, it is always optimal to inject sufficient liquidity
to fully crowd out the entire supply of private liquidity. The question, then, is whether
governments should allow liquidity to flow freely or to segment it.
Part ii) of Proposition 6 provides the answer. The properties of the welfare manifold in
the θ∗D dimension already restrict candidates to a segmentation maximum to the corners
of the relevant area and to model parameters such that ∆
Γ
> 2. In fact, we can narrow
down the set of candidates to segmentation maxima to the case where
θ∗G
Θ
< 1
2
. To see why,
compare full segmentation with zero segmentation, both with the same binding G con-
straint,
θ∗T
Θ
=
θ∗G
Θ
; see Figure 5. The probabilities of avoiding a crisis are
θ∗G
Θ
and 1
2
(
2θ∗G
Θ
)2
,
respectively. Clearly, the former exceeds the latter so that segmentation decreases the
overall probability of crisis. Hence, on the balance of probabilities, segmentation makes a
positive contribution to welfare. It is still the case, however, that segmentation trades off
a mild crisis for a severe one, which makes a negative contribution to welfare. Comparing
the value of WA across the two corners of the relevant areas we find out that segmentation
is a global maximum for
θ∗T
Θ
=
θ∗G
Θ
< 3
8
< 1
2
(and ∆
Γ
> 2). When
θ∗G
Θ
> 1
2
segmentation
increases the overall probability of crisis. Adding in the argument regarding the trade-off
between mild and severe crisis, segmentation decreases welfare, unambiguously.
Part iii) of Proposition 6 is provided for completeness: unlike in the single-country
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Figure 5: Two countries, full crowding out, free flow versus segmentation when
θ∗G
Θ
< 1
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case, in the two country case, even when ∆
Γ
> 2, it is no longer optimal to inject liquidity
to bring the probability of crisis down to zero. Intuitively, as total liquidity approaches
2Θ, the crisis probability is so small, see Figure 2, that the benefit of decreasing it further
is not sufficient to cover the cost of liquidity.
Technicalities aside, the substantive point of Proposition 6 is that it gives rise to
our pecking order result. With fire-sale externalities and financial crisis, the competitive
equilibrium is socially inefficient. Policy measures to decrease the probability of crisis are
therefore justified on efficiency grounds. Nevertheless, the use of segmentation policies
is only justified under very special circumstances. Even when segmentation optima do
exist, they will vanish once the G constraint is relaxed sufficiently. Hence, the following
rule of thumb may be formulated: to enhance welfare, coordinated governments’ first
priority should be the injection of subsidized liquidity. Segmentation policies should be
considered only when the governments have run out of the tax capacity to inject more
liquidity. Even then, segmentation policies are not guaranteed to be welfare enhancing.
The reason is rooted in the public good nature of liquidity and, hence, its under provision
in a competitive equilibrium. The best way to address such a problem is directly, by
injecting more liquidity, rather than indirectly, through segmentation, which has other
undesirable implication such as the substitution of mild financial crises by more severe
ones.
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5.2.1 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 6 draws on a global characterization of the welfare function, WA.
To that end, we compute the total derivatives of welfare with respect to simultaneous and
symmetric variations in , θ∗T and θ
∗
D; remember θ
∗
M = (θ
∗
D, θ
∗
D, θ
∗
T , 2θ
∗
T ). The computation
is done through various combinations of the partial derivatives (28) to (31), to account for
governments’ coordination:any change in policy in country A is matched, simultaneously
and symmetrically, by country B. Hence,
∂WA (θ
∗
M)
∂θ∗T
=
∂WA
∂θ∗A,T
+ 2
∂WA
∂θ∗
= Γ
[
2 (1−ΨA∨B)
(
∆
Γ
− 1
)
+ (ΨA∨B −Ψe)
]
, (34)
∂WA (θ
∗
M)
∂θ∗D
=
∂WA
∂θ∗A,D
+
∂WA
∂θ∗B,D
=
θ∗D
Θ
Γ
[(
1− 22θ
∗
T − θ∗D
Θ
)
∆
Γ
− 2
(
1− 3
2
2θ∗T − θ∗D
Θ
)]
.
(35)
Lemma 1 provides a comprehensive description of the welfare manifold of the WA function.
Note that although the proof of Proposition 6 makes use of the properties of the manifold
over just a subspace of the relevant area,
θ∗T
Θ
>
√
1−Ψe, the lemma applies to the entire
relevant area, thus supporting much of the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1. The welfare manifold of the WA function is characterized by the following
properties:
i) For any point such that ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e, welfare is increasing in total liquidity, θ∗T .
ii) For ∆
Γ
∈ (1, 3
2
)
, welfare is concave in total liquidity, θ∗T . Iff
∆
Γ
< 1+ Ψ
e
2
, there exists
a function
_
θ T (θ
∗
D) such that
∂WA(θ∗M)
∂θ∗T
= 0 with θ∗M =
(
θ∗D, θ
∗
D,
_
θ T (θ
∗
D) , 2
_
θ T (θ
∗
D)
)
∈ LR;
otherwise, welfare is increasing in θ∗T over the entire relevant area, LR. For ∆Γ > 32 ,
welfare is convex in θ∗T and increasing over the entire relevant area, LR.
iii) For ∆
Γ
> 2, welfare is convex in segmented liquidity θ∗D. There exists a function,
`
θD (θ
∗
T ) = 2
θ∗T
Θ
− ∆Γ−2
2(∆Γ− 32)
such that for θ∗M =
(`
θD (θ
∗
T ) ,
`
θD (θ
∗
T ) , θ
∗
T , 2θ
∗
T
)
∈ LR, ∂WA(θ
∗
M)
∂θ∗D
=
0. For ∆
Γ
∈ (1, 2], welfare is concave and decreasing in θ∗D over the entire relevant area,
LR.
iv) Welfare is constant in θ∗D for θ
∗
M /∈ LR
Proof see Appendix B.
When ∆
Γ
≤ 1 + Ψe
2
there exist combinations of (θ∗T , θ
∗
D) inside the relevant area such
that
∂WA(θ∗M)
∂θ∗T
= 0. Since WA is concave in θ
∗
T when
∆
Γ
≤ 1 + Ψe
2
(point ii) of Lemma
1), these points correspond to welfare maxima with respect to θ∗T (i.e. changing θ
∗
T while
holding θ∗D constant) and we label the corresponding function by
_
θ T (θ
∗
D). It is homothetic
to the ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e curve. Hence, in panel (a) the horizontal arrows point towards
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the
_
θ T curve. Likewise, when
∆
Γ
> 2, there exists a linear
`
θD (θ
∗
T ) function such that for
any combination
(
θ∗T ,
`
θD (θ
∗
T )
)
,
∂WA(θ∗M)
∂θ∗D
= 0. The
`
θD (θ
∗
T ) function is represented by a
straight line with a slope of 2, parallel to the lower bound of the relevant area; see panel
(c) of Figure 4. Since WA is convex in θ
∗
D (see proof of Lemma 1), the graph of the
`
θD (θ
∗
T )
function collects minima in the θ∗D dimension and the vertical arrows point away from the
`
θD curve.
Part i) of Proposition 6 follows immediately from part i) of Lemma 1 and from Corol-
lary 1.
As for part ii) of Proposition 6, when ∆
Γ
≤ 2 WA is decreasing in θ∗D over the entire
relevant area. It follows that zero segmentation is optimal there. When ∆
Γ
> 2, WA
is convex in θ∗D so that the social optimum is a corner solution, with either full or zero
segmentation, both with a binding G constraint; see Figure 4. In a segmentation optimum
the G constraint must bind, otherwise welfare can be increased by injecting more liquidity,
i.e., increasing θ∗T , up to the point where either the constraint binds or the lower bound of
the relevant area, LR, is reached (with zero segmentation). We search for global optima
by comparing the zero and full segmentation corners along the binding θ∗G. If
θ∗G
Θ
≤ 1
2
,
the zero and full segmentation corners are located at θ∗D = 0 and θ
∗
D = θ
∗
G, respectively.
Substituting into WA (θ
∗
M), full segmentation dominates iff
∆
Γ
(
4
3
θ∗G
Θ
− 1
2
)
≤ 2θ
∗
G
Θ
− 1. (36)
Solving for
θ∗G
Θ
yields (32). If
θ∗G
Θ
> 1
2
, the zero and full segmentation corners are located
at
θ∗D
Θ
= −1 + 2 θ∗G
Θ
(the lower of the relevant area, LR) and θ∗D = θ∗G . Substituting into
WA (θ
∗
M) shows that full segmentation is never optimal in this case.
As for part iii), when the tax constraint does not bind (we determine below for which
tax capacity this is the case), we know that the optimum features zero segmentation. By
inspecting the welfare derivative on the lower bound of the relevant area, it can be shown
that the welfare function reaches its unconstrained maximum at a value
θ∗T
Θ
< 1
2
if and
only if ∆
Γ
< 1 + Ψ
e
2
and at a value 1 >
θ∗T
Θ
≥ 1
2
otherwise. The exact value of the maximum
can be obtained by substituting θ∗D = 0 into the welfare derivative (34) when
∆
Γ
< 1 + Ψ
e
2
and setting it to zero. When ∆
Γ
≥ 1 + Ψe
2
, we compute
dWA
dθ∗T
∣∣∣∣ θ∗
D
Θ
=−1+2 θ
∗
T
Θ
=
∂WA
∂θ∗T
+ 2
∂WA
∂θ∗D
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and substitute
θ∗D
Θ
= −1 + 2 θ∗T
Θ
into the corresponding welfare derivatives. Doing so yields
θR
Θ
=

1
2
√
1−Ψe
3
2
−∆
Γ
if ∆
Γ
< 1
2
+ Ψe
∆
Γ
−2+
√
(∆Γ−1)
2−(∆Γ− 32)Ψe
2(∆Γ− 32)
if ∆
Γ
≥ 1
2
+ Ψe
(37)

5.3 Partial crowding out (0 <
θ∗G
Θ <
√
1−Ψe)
We complete the analysis with the 0 <
θ∗G
Θ
<
√
1−Ψe case, where the tax capacity is too
low to fully crowd out private liquidity. The following regimes are conceivable.
First, the governments can coordinate policies that allow both private and public
liquidity to flow freely. By a similar argument to that in Proposition 2, as long as the
speculators still participate in the liquidity markets, the injection of free-flowing liquidity
is ineffective because public liquidity crowds out, one for one, private liquidity with no
effect on total liquidity or the probability of crisis.
Second, the governments can inject segmented or free-flowing liquidity and at the same
time restrict the free flow of private liquidity. Proposition 7 below demonstrates that such
a policy is sub-optimal.
Finally, the governments can inject segmented liquidity and, at the same time, allow
the free flow of private liquidity. If speculators participate, the probability of crisis, ΨA∨B,
must be Ψe, which allows them to break even. Note that, in this case, segmented liquidity,
which can be used only domestically, is an imperfect substitute to free-flowing liquidity
that can be used in both countries. As a result, the injection of public (segmented)
liquidity crowds out some private (free-flowing) liquidity, but less than one for one; see
the derivative (33) of the implicit function ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e. Diagrammatically, such a
policy can be illustrated as a movement along the ΨA∨B = Ψe curve in Figure 4, where the
injection of segmented public liquidity, θ∗D, boosts the total amount of liquidity (private
and public), θ∗T , which provides an extra motive for a segmentation policy. Hence,
Proposition 7. Suppose 0 <
θ∗G
Θ
<
√
1−Ψe. It is optimal for the governments of coun-
tries A and B to coordinate policies such that
i) No private liquidity is ever segmented (so that θ∗D below applies to public segmented
liquidity alone).
ii) Condition (32) from Proposition 6 is sufficient but no longer necessary for segmen-
tation to be optimal. There are parameter values such that condition (32) is not satisfied
but it is still optimal for the governments to inject segmented liquidity (θ∗D > 0).
(iii) There are parameter values such that governments supply public liquidity but do
not segment it.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for Part i) of Proposition 7 is the following: given a certain level of
segmented public liquidity, θ∗D, restricting the free flow of private liquidity implies that
total liquidity falls; the policy shifts the equilibrium from the ΨA∨B = Ψe curve, leftwards.
By part i) of Lemma 1 the welfare manifold is increasing in total liquidity (see arrows
in Figure 4), so the policy is welfare decreasing. Note also that such a policy would
increase the probability of crisis and, therefore, “earn” the governments a higher rate of
return, even higher than the speculators’ rate of return, ρ. That is, instead of subsidizing
liquidity, the governments would impose a tax, which is contrary to our line of argument
so far.
For part ii) of Proposition 7, that the injection of segmented liquidity boosts total
liquidity, it gives governments an additional motive to segment, over and above the level
implied by equation (32) in Proposition 6. As a result, condition (32), which was neces-
sary and sufficient for segmentation under full crowding out, becomes sufficient but not
necessary under partial crowding out. Technically, there are some (not all!) parameter
values (∆,Γ,Ψe) where segmentation of public liquidity is sub-optimal if
θ∗G
Θ
>
√
1−Ψe
but is optimal once the inequality is reversed. Clearly, the liquidity boosting effect is
active, but not sufficiently strong to dominate globally. In particular, consider the case
where ∆
Γ
< 2. Where
θ∗G
Θ
>
√
1−Ψe (full crowding out) the optimal policy (unambigu-
ously) is to switch from segmented to free-flowing public liquidity, but leave the total
amount of liquidity at the same level. But where
θ∗G
Θ
<
√
1−Ψe (partial crowding out),
it is no longer possible to decrease the amount of segmented public liquidity but leave
the total amount of liquidity intact: moving along the ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e curve, as the
governments inject less segmented liquidity, total liquidity also drops. As a result, some
level of segmentation might be optimal.
For part iii) of Proposition 7, it might be optimal for the governments to inject liquidity
but to avoid segmentation altogether (along the horizontal axis in Figure 4). Doing so,
the governments push the probability of crisis below Ψe, so the speculators no longer wish
to participate in the liquidity market. (They are crowded out rather than restricted from
participating.) As a result, total liquidity decreases. However, we show that such a policy
is optimal when
θ∗G
Θ
approaches
√
1−Ψe from below. For then, the welfare gain from
pooling public liquidity compensates for the (small) drop in total liquidity.
5.4 Implications
Proposition 8 consolidates the main results of Sections 5.2 to 5.3 into our key “pecking
order” result for market segmentation:
Proposition 8. (i) It is never optimal to segment private liquidity.
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(ii) The injection of segmented public liquidity is sometimes optimal. If (
θ∗G
Θ
≥ √1−Ψe),
then condition (32) provides a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal segmentation.
If (
θ∗G
Θ
<
√
1−Ψe), then condition (32) is sufficient but not necessary for the optimality
of segmentation.
(iii) Whenever parameter values (∆,Γ,Ψe) and tax capacity θ∗G are such that the injec-
tion of segmented public liquidity is optimal, a sufficiently large increase in tax capacity
makes the segmentation of public liquidity sub-optimal.
Proof. Parts i) and ii) of Proposition 8 are immediate. For part iii), by part i) of Lemma
1, within the partial crowding out regime, if the governments could increase the amount of
total liquidity, keeping segmented liquidity constant, i.e., moving leftwards off any point
on the ΨA∨B = Ψe curve, then welfare would increase. Such a move is not feasible when
the G constraint binds, but is feasible once the constraint is sufficiently relaxed. Once
in the region where ΨA∨B < Ψe, to the right of the ΨA∨B = Ψe curve, condition (32) in
Proposition 6 applies.
The pecking order result means that segmentation policies are dominated by liquid-
ity injection policies, as long as these are not constrained by tax capacity. Coordinated
governments may segment their own injected liquidity only when tax capacity constrains
them from dealing with the public good aspect of liquidity directly, by enhancing the sup-
ply of public liquidity. That segmentation is only a poor substitute to liquidity injection
is due to the policy’s inherent inefficiency: it leaves underutilized liquidity that could be
used to fend off a severe financial crisis, while its contagion avoidance benefit is effective
only against a mild financial crisis. Even in those cases where the use of segmentation
policies is welfare-enhancing, the policy should be applied to public liquidity alone, never
restricting the free flow of private liquidity.
6 Uncoordinated policies
In this section, we characterize Nash equilibria where both governments choose a mix
of liquidity injection and segmentation policies without coordination. That is, we depart
from the assumption made in Section 5 that any change in country A’s policies is matched,
simultaneously and symmetrically, by country B. Otherwise, the setting is identical to
that of Section 5; that is, policy decisions are taken ex ante, at t = 0, simultaneously.
Policy decisions are announced and the governments commit to execute them as planned.
The analysis covers the same three cases that are identified in Section 5, with zero, high
and medium tax capacity. The main result is that a lack of coordination results in (weak)
excess segmentation:
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Proposition 9. i) It is never part of a Nash equilibrium to segment private liquidity. ii)
The Nash equilibrium features excess segmentation in the following sense: For parameter
values such that coordinated governments segment public liquidity, they also segment public
liquidity when not coordinated, in a Nash equilibrium, but the opposite is not true. That
is, there are parameter values such that coordinated governments do not segment public
liquidity but uncoordinated governments do.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The easiest way to convey the intuition of part i) of Proposition 9 is by examining the
special case where G = 0 so that the governments’ only decision is whether to segment
private liquidity. Consider the response of country A, for example, to the various strategies
of country B. Suppose country B plays free flow. A response by country A to segment is
ineffective: by Corollary 1, country A’s speculators cannot break even so they withdraw
from the market. But then, country A′s market is serviced by country B’s speculators.
It follows that any attempt by country A to create a domestic liquidity buffer through
segmentation is futile. Suppose, next, that country B plays segmentation. If country A
responds by playing segmentation, it imposes a segmentation regime on both countries.
By Proposition 5) the result is to decrease its own welfare, as well as its neighbour’s. It
follows that segmentation is a weakly dominated strategy when G = 0.
To convey the intuition of part ii) we focus on the Nash equilibrium in the case of full
crowding out. Consider, again, the case where country B plays free flow. If country A
responds by playing segmentation it captures the benefit of avoiding crisis when θA ≤ θ∗G
and θB > θ
∗
G and, at the same time, benefit from an inflow of liquidity from country B
when θA ∈
(
θ∗G
Θ
, 2
θ∗G
Θ
]
and θB < θ
∗
G. In terms of Figure 5, it can capture the lightly shaded
triangle without losing the darkly shaded trapezoid.
On a more heuristic level, the results can be motivated by the public-good property of
liquidity. When the governments have no capacity to provide the good themselves, they
should at least refrain from undermining (second-best) competitive supply. However,
when governments do have the capacity to provide the good themselves, they have an
incentive to prevent others from free-riding on it. That is, the beggar-thy-neighbour
problem arises only when the liquidity market is taken over by the governments.
7 Concluding remarks
Classic results in economics imply that, in a frictionless world, free flow of goods, services
and financial securities constitute a necessary condition for an efficient allocation. Some,
such as Stiglitz (2010), have stipulated a dramatic reversal of the results in a world prone
to financial crisis and contagion. Using a micro-founded model of financial crisis driven by
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leverage and fire sales, we note some inherent inefficiencies associated with a segmentation
policy.
We show that segmentation leaves underutilized liquidity that, had it been allowed
to flow freely, could have been used in order to fend off a severe financial crisis. At the
same time, the benefit of segmentation is in avoiding contagion and withstand only a
mild financial crisis. In our model, the welfare cost of crisis increases with the severity of
the underlying shock, rendering the trade off introduced by segmentation unfavourable.
Nonetheless, segmentation of public liquidity can be welfare-enhancing in some cases, but
only as a second best measure, once the direct measure of liquidity injections is constrained
from resolving the inherent externalities that plague the liquidity market. Our analysis
can be neatly summarized in a pecking order result for segmentation.
Segmentation is a generic concept, relevant beyond the context of international fi-
nance. This concept includes, for example, policies such as separating different types of
banking activities or imposing constraints on the ability of one financial institution to
use its liquidity to trade with another financial institution. Needless to say, our analysis
addresses a special case, both in terms of the application and in terms of the modelling
choices that we make. Nevertheless, we believe that some of the insights are quite gen-
eral. First, segmentation is likely to swap a less severe crisis for a more severe one, an
effect that is likely to be negative in other micro-founded settings. Second, any benefit of
segmentation is likely to be attenuated once analyzed within a general equilibrium setting
and once public liquidity injections are added to the policy mix. It will be instructive to
adapt the main ideas contained in this paper to other applications, for example, the desir-
ability of mutualizing deposit insurance schemes internationally, or the effect of requiring
multinational banks to be capitalized at the subsidiary rather than the holding company
level.
Lastly, our paper may shed some new light on issues discussed in certain policy circles
regarding the world’s financial architecture. For example, the idea that short-term capital
flows may be undesirable has become much more acceptable following the 2008 financial
crisis. At the same time, the role of governments and central banks in the provision of
liquidity has vastly expanded. We suggest that the two developments may be related along
the lines of Section 6 above: having gained a dominant position in the liquidity market,
uncoordinated governments use segmentation as a means to limit foreign governments
from free-riding on the public good that they provide. The analysis in Section 4 suggest
that this issue may be a coordination failure: if the governments could commit to avoid
segmentation, then welfare might be enhanced.
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Table 1: The joint distribution of macro and individual shocks
n c total
no distress, u ψnu ≡ (1−Ψ)− Θ2 (1−Ψ)2 ψcu ≡ Ψ− Θ2
[
1− (1−Ψ)2] 1− Θ
2
distress, d ψnd ≡ Θ2 (1−Ψ)2 ψcd ≡ Θ2
[
1− (1−Ψ)2] Θ
2
total 1−Ψ Ψ 1
APPENDIX A
Proof of rest of proposition 1
We prove that conjectures (5) and (4) hold in equilibrium by demonstrating that any
single-investor deviation, k˜, R˜s, λ˜su, λ˜
s
d, etc., from the equilibrium behavior, k, R, λ
s,
given equilibrium prices and allocations, qs and any probability of crisis Ψ ≤ Ψe, are
sub-optimal.
We proceed by proving the following sequence of claims:
Claim 1: Operating at a scale k˜ > k is sub-optimal.
Claim 2: All fire sales are executed at market prices; state contingent debt repayments
are sub-optimal.
Claim 3: Hoarding liquidity, such that k˜ < b+ w, is sub-optimal.
Claim 4: Operating at a scale k˜ < k is sub-optimal.
Claim 5: The investor’s participation constraint is satisfied.
The joint distribution of the macro events, n, c and the liquidity shocks, u, d is described
in Table 2.
Proof of Claim 1 (k˜ > k is sub-optimal)
For k˜ > k, the investor has to sell some capital even when he is not in distress in order
to meet the debt repayment. The fraction of capital λ˜su to be sold is given by λ˜
s
uk˜q
s +(
1− λ˜su
)
k˜y2 = R˜.
In case of distress, the amount of fire sales is determined by equation (7), as before.
It follows that
λ˜su =
ρ− y2
qs − y2 − ρ
w
k˜ (qs − y2)
, λ˜sd =
ρ− y2 +m
qs − y2 +m − ρ
w
k˜ (qs − y2 +m)
.
The investor’s expected payoff is thus
ψnu (1− λnu) k˜y3 + ψcu (1− λcu) k˜y3 + ψnd (1− λnd) k˜y3 + ψcd (1− λcd) k˜y3.
Substituting λ˜su and λ˜
s
d and differentiating with respect to k˜, we derive a condition for the
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sub-optimality of k˜ > k,
ψnu
qn − ρ
qn − y2y3 + ψ
c
u
qc − ρ
qc − y2y3 + ψ
n
d
qn − ρ
qn − y2 +my3 + ψ
c
d
qc − ρ
qc − y2 +my3 < 0,
which is satisfied since qn > qc and because ρ > qn by parametric assumption A2.
Proof of Claim 2 (indexation of debt repayments is sub-optimal)
We start with an arbitrage argument in the spirit of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) to
rule out contracts that separate distressed from non-distressed investors, thereby providing
insurance against financial distress. Suppose a third party, or perhaps the lender himself,
guarantees a fire sale transfer price different from the market price. Effectively, such a
contract is a put option. It would be exercised whenever the strike price exceeds the
market price, regardless of whether the investor is distressed. Both ways, he would buy
capital goods on the fire sale market at a low price and exercise the option. Note that the
assumptions made in Section 2 about the investor’s portfolio opacity play an important
role in this argument: if capital goods could be tagged, and if the insurer could commit to
buying back only items originating in the investor’s own project, then the contract could
be implemented. A direct observation on down scaling would have a similar effect.
Though put options cannot separate distressed from non-distressed investors, they can
still be used in order to make transfers, contingent on macro realizations, from speculators
to investors. As such, they are equivalent to debt indexation. Suppose, by way of contra-
diction, a contract R(θ). The proof proceeds by showing that there is no interval of θ on
which it would be optimal to set a lower payment than R = ky2. It follows from (7) that a
rebate R (θ) < ky2 is more valuable when the price of capital is low, i.e., at q
c: the rebate
offers insurance against selling into an illiquid market. Moreover, θ affects an investor’s
payoff only via its effect on the price of the productive assets. For an individual investor
it therefore does not matter in which of the crisis states the rebate is granted. Finally,
since the rebate is fairly priced, and payoffs are linear in project scale, an investor will
either choose no rebate, or a rebate in all crisis states. We therefore now focus, w.l.o.g. on
the case where a constant rebate in all crisis states is granted. We denote the repayment
in the crisis and non-crisis states by R˜c < R˜n. The lender’s participation constraint,
(1−Ψ) R˜n + ΨR˜c = ρ
(
k˜ − w
)
,
has to be satisfied. Since it is still optimal to scale up to the limit that can be afforded
by a non-distressed investor, we have R˜n = k˜y2, and hence,
R˜c = k˜y2 − ρw − k˜ (ρ− y2)
Ψ
.
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Clearly, k˜ < k. The λs are still determined by (7), so
λ˜n = λn, λ˜c =
m− 1
Ψ
[
ρw
k˜
− (ρ− y2)
]
qc − y2 +m .
Note that this policy leaves the investor with a slack, k˜y2−R˜c, if he is not distressed while
the economy is in financial crisis. Substituting the above expressions into the investor’s
expected payoff,
ψnu k˜y3+ψ
c
u
[
k˜y3 +
ρw − k˜ (ρ− y2)
Ψ
]
+ψnd
qn − y2
qn − y2 +mk˜y3+ψ
c
d
qc − y2 + 1Ψ
[
ρw
k˜
− (ρ− y2)
]
qc − y2 +m k˜y3,
and differentiating with respect to k˜, we derive a condition for the sub-optimality of the
R˜c < R˜n policy (in the k˜ < k region),
ψnuy3 + ψ
c
u
(
y3 − ρ− y2
Ψ
)
+ ψnd
qn − y2
qn − y2 +my3 + ψ
c
d
qc − y2 − 1Ψ (ρ− y2)
qc − y2 +m y3 ≥ 0. (38)
Solving the inequality for ρ, using the unconditional probability of distress ψnd + ψ
c
d =
Θ
2
and ψcu + ψ
c
d = Ψ, we obtain
ρ ≤ y2 + y3
1− Θ
2
λn − ψcd (λc − λn)
1 +
ψcd
Ψ
(
y3
m
1−γ
− 1
) .
This can be written as
ρ ≤ y2 + y3
1− Θ
2
λn − Θ
2
Ψ (2−Ψ) (λc − λn)
1 + Θ
2
(2−Ψ)
(
y3
m
1−γ
− 1
) .
Notice that the numerator of the term on y3 is lowest when Ψ = 1, while the denominator
is highest when Ψ = 0. It thus follows that
1− Θ
2
λn − Θ
2
Ψ (2−Ψ) (λc − λn)
1 + Θ
2
(2−Ψ)
(
y3
m
1−γ
− 1
) > 1− Θ2 λc
1 + Θ
(
y3
m
1−γ
− 1
) ,
and thus, parametric assumption A4 is a sufficient condition.
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Proof of Claim 3 (hoarding liquidity is sub-optimal):
Suppose that an investor sets aside liquidity, l˜ = w + b˜− k˜ > 0, while still borrowing up
to R˜ = k˜y2 and R˜ = ρb˜. Using (3), it follows that
l˜ = w − k˜
(
ρ− y2
ρ
)
.
That provides him with an extra resource to fund maintenance and debt repayments and
moderate fire sales. Instead of equation (7), λ˜sd is determined by
λ˜sdq
sk˜ +
(
1− λ˜sd
)
y2k˜ + w − k˜
(
ρ− y2
ρ
)
=
(
1− λ˜sd
)
m+ R˜.
Additionally, the investor would turn into a liquidity supplier if he is not distressed:
ysu = k˜y3 + r
s
[
w − k˜
(
ρ− y2
ρ
)]
.
Substituting the above expressions in the investor’s expected payoff and differentiating
with respect to k˜, we derive a condition for the sub-optimality of the hoarding policy (in
the k˜ < k region):
ψnu
(
y3 − ρ− y2
ρ
)
+ψcu
(
y3 − ρ− y2
ρ
rc
)
+ψnd
qn − y2 − ρ−y2ρ
qn − y2 +m y3 +ψ
c
d
qc − y2 − ρ−y2ρ
qc − y2 +m y3 ≥ 0.
(39)
To prove that condition (39) holds, we subtract the LHS of inequality (38) from the LHS
of inequality (39) and show that the result is positive:
(ρ− y2)
[
ψnu
(
−1
ρ
)
+ ψcu
(
−r
c
ρ
+
1
Ψ
)
+ ψnd
−1
ρ
qn − y2 +my3 + ψ
c
d
−1
ρ
+ 1
Ψ
qc − y2 +my3
]
≥ 0.
By parametric assumptions A1 and A2, it follows that ρ− y2 > 0. Since we consider only
Ψ < Ψe, and since rc = (ρ − 1 + Ψe)/Ψe is decreasing in Ψe, we can derive a sufficient
condition by replacing rc with an upper bound (ρ−1 + Ψ)/Ψ ≥ rc. Using the expressions
for qn and qc, and using parametric assumption A1 once again, we reduce the above to
the sufficient condition
ψnu (−1) + ψcu
(
1−Ψ
Ψ
)
+ ψnd
(
−1
δ
)
+ ψcd
(−Ψ + ρ
Ψ
)
1
δ
≥ 0.
Substituting theψs from the joint-distribution table above, this simplifies to(
1
δ
− 1
)
(1−Ψ) Ψ + [1− (1−Ψ)2] ρ− 1
δ
> 0,
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which is true.
Proof of Claim 4 (Operating at a scale k˜ < k is sub-optimal)
Suppose that an investor operates at a scale w < k˜ < k and thus borrows an amount
0 < b˜ < k − w. In that case, the required repayment R˜ = ρb˜ < k˜y2 leaves the non-
distressed investor with spare period-2 income:
ysu = k˜y3 + k˜y2 − R˜ = k˜y3 + k˜y2 − ρ
(
k˜ − w
)
.
For the distressed investor, the λs are determined by
λ˜sdq
sk˜ +
(
1− λ˜sd
)
k˜y2 =
(
1− λ˜sd
)
mk˜ + ρ
(
k˜ − w
)
.
Substituting the above expressions in the investor’s expected payoff and differentiating
with respect to k˜, we derive a condition for the sub-optimality of this policy:
(ψnu + ψ
c
u) (y2 + y3 − ρ) + ψnd
qn − ρ
qn − y2 +my3 + ψ
c
d
qc − ρ
qc − y2 +my3 ≥ 0. (40)
To prove that condition (40) holds, we subtract the LHS of inequality (38) from the LHS
of inequality (40) and show that the result is positive:
(ρ− y2)
[
ψnu (−1) + ψcu
(
−1 + 1
Ψ
)
− ψnd
1
qn − y2 +my3 + ψ
c
d
−1 + 1
ψ
qc − y2 +my3
]
≥ 0.
From assumptions A1 and A2, it follows that ρ−y2 > 0. Using the expressions for qn and
qc, and using assumption A1 once again, we reduce the above to the sufficient condition
ψnu (−1) + ψcu
(
1−Ψ
Ψ
)
− ψnd
1
δ
+ ψcd
(
1−Ψ
Ψ
)
1
δ
≥ 0,
which reduces after the substitution of theψs (from the joint-distribution table above) to(
1
δ
− 1
)
Ψ ≥ 0.
Proof of claim 5 (the investor’s participation constrained is satisfied)
Substituting project size k = w ρ
ρ−y2. into the expected payoff and solving for ρ yields
ρ ≤ y2 + y3
[
ψnu + ψ
c
u + ψ
n
d
(
1− m
δy3
)
+ ψcdγ
]
. (41)
39
Since 1− m
δy3
≥ γ (and using the ψs from the joint distribution function above), that can
be reduced to the sufficient condition
ρ ≤ y2 + y3
[
1− (1− γ) Θ
2
]
,
which is implied by assumption A4.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Lemma 1
i) That welfare is increasing in θ∗T for any combination of (θ
∗
T , θ
∗
D) such that ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) =
Ψe follows immediately from equation (34) and the fact that ∆
Γ
> 1.
ii) For concavity, compute
∂
∂θ∗T
∂WA
∂θ∗T
= 2Γ
(
3
2
− ∆
Γ
)
∂ΨA∨B
∂θ∗T
. (42)
and notice that the second derivative (42) is negative for ∆
Γ
∈ (1, 3
2
). Note that the
derivative (34) is a function of θ∗T and θ
∗
D only via ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M). To find
_
θ T (θ
∗
D) just set the
derivative (34) equal to zero and solve for ΨA∨B, which yields the solution
_
ΨT =
Ψe−2(∆Γ−1)
1−2(∆Γ−1)
and implicitly provides
_
θ T (θ
∗
D). Notice that on the interval
∆
Γ
∈ (1, 3
2
) ,
_
ΨT is positive only
if ∆
Γ
< 1 + Ψ
e
2
. For ∆
Γ
∈ (1 + Ψ
e
2
, 3
2
) the derivative (34) is positive for any ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) ≥ 0.
If ∆
Γ
> 3
2
, welfare is convex in θ∗T and since it is increasing for ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e it is also
increasing for the entire relevant area, LR.
iii) We rewrite the derivative (35) as
∂WA
∂θ∗D
=
θ∗D
Θ
Γ
[
2
(
∆
Γ
− 3
2
)
θ∗D − 2θ∗T
Θ
+
∆
Γ
− 2
]
. (43)
If ∆
Γ
≤ 2 then the above expression is negative over the entire relevant area. For ∆
Γ
> 2
we set the derivative (43) equal to zero and solve out for any θ∗T to derive the function:
`
θD (θ
∗
T ) = 2
θ∗T
Θ
−
∆
Γ
− 2
2
(
∆
Γ
− 3
2
) . (44)
We also compute the second derivative of the welfare function with respect to θ∗D:
∂
∂θ∗D
∂WA
∂θ∗D
=
1
θ∗D
∂WA
∂θ∗D
+ 2Γ
θ∗D
Θ2
(
∆
Γ
− 3
2
)
. (45)
From (45), we can see that the welfare function is locally convex in θ∗D for any point on
`
θD (θ
∗
T ). Notice that
`
θD (θ
∗
T ) function is a complete description of the points where the
derivative (43) changes sign.
iv) Suppose θ∗D < 2θ
∗
T−Θ. For any realization such that θA+θB ≤ θ∗ (remember θ∗ = 2θ∗T )
there is sufficient liquidity in the world to avoid a financial crisis in both countries; for
any realization such that θA + θB > θ
∗, both countries suffer a financial crisis. Hence,
for any realization (θA, θB), a “small” increase in θ
∗
D will affect neither the incidence of
financial crisis nor social welfare. 
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Proof of Proposition 7
i) Let θ∗T be defined by Ψi (0, 0, θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ) = Ψ
e so that (θ∗T , 0) is the point where the
ΨA∨B = Ψe curve intersects with the horizontal axis in Figure 4 (clearly, affected by model
parameters). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the governments coordinate the
injection of free-flowing liquidity but force segmentation on the speculators. The amount
of private-segmented liquidity is determined, implicitly, by a new function, Ψi (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e.
By Corollary 1, ΨA∨B (θ
∗
M) > Ψ
e; it follows that the graph of this new function lies to
the left of the ΨA∨B = Ψe curve in Figure 4. Changes in public free-flowing liquidity shift
the equilibrium along the curve. Since, by construction, country i’s probability of crisis
remains constant along the curve, Proposition 5’s argument applies: segmentation trades
off a severe crisis for an equal probability mild crisis and is therefore sub-optimal. Hence,
the optimal policy is to inject sufficient free-flowing public liquidity to fully crowd out all
private (segmented) liquidity. Clearly, total liquidity at this point (the new Ψi (θ
∗
M) = Ψ
e
curve intersects with the horizontal axis) is equal to θ∗T and can thus be reached by allowing
the free flow of private liquidity with no public liquidity injections. The combination of
segmented public liquidity and free-flowing private liquidity therefore dominates. If both
public and private liquidity are segmented, then the total liquidity supply can be increased
by relaxing the flow constraint on private liquidity. By point (i) of Lemma 1, this is welfare
improvement.
ii) Suppose that θ∗G ≥ θ∗T and that condition (32) just holds: ∆Γ ≥ 2 and
θ∗G
Θ
= 3
8
∆
Γ
−2
∆
Γ
− 3
2
.
By Proposition 6 (θ∗T , θ
∗
T ) welfare dominates (0, θ
∗
T ), weakly (notice that the proof of
Proposition 6 makes no use of the condition
θ∗G
Θ
≥ √1−Ψe; hence, the statement holds
regardless). In comparison, by part i) of Lemma 1, an equilibrium where public segmented
liquidity is θ∗G and private liquidity is allowed to flow freely (a shift leftwards from the
diagonal to the ΨA∨B = Ψe curve) welfare dominates (θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ), strictly. By the continuity
of the welfare manifold, it follows that segmentation is optimal under strictly weaker
conditions than those of (32).
iii) The argument above implies that welfare is increasing in liquidity along the
ΨA∨B = Ψe curve when ∆Γ ≥ 2 , including the case of equality. Consider the case where
∆
Γ
is just below 2 and
θ∗G
Θ
just below
√
1−Ψe. By Proposition 6, (√1−Ψe, 0) dominates(√
1−Ψe,√1−Ψe). By continuity of the welfare manifold, coordinated governments
should pool their resources and inject freely flowing liquidity, even at the “cost” of some
loss of total liquidity.
Proof of Proposition 9
To prove part i), consider any symmetric candidate Nash equilibrium that has a positive
amount of private liquidity supply. We analyze the best response of country, A.
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a) Suppose that country B allows private liquidity to flow freely. If country A also
allows private liquidity to flow freely, then a regime of free flow obtains with a liquidity
configuration somewhere on the Ψe curve. If instead country A segments private liquidity,
its supply has to adjust until ΨA = Ψ
e, while private liquidity supply in B adjusts until
ΨA∨B = Ψe. Since, by Corollary 1, ΨA∨B ≥ ΨA, private liquidity supply in A is fully
crowded out, the liquidity configuration and welfare in A remain unchanged.
b) Suppose that country B segments private liquidity. If country A also segments, then
we obtain a liquidity configuration with segmented liquidity denoted by θ̂∗A,D, the precise
value of which depends on the amount of public liquidity each government supplies, but
that in any case generates a crisis probability ΨA = Ψ
e. If instead A allows its private
liquidity to flow freely, its supply adjusts to yield ΨA∨B = Ψe. Hence, the crisis probability
in A falls or stays the same; but then, such a policy reduces the probability of crisis for
realizations θA > θ̂
∗
A,D and increase the probability of crisis for realizations θA < θ̂
∗
A,D .
We already know that such a trade-off enhances welfare.
The proof of part ii) follows the same three cases as in Section 5.2. The argument
for the G = 0 is just a special case of the proof of part i). The main text elaborates.
Moving to full crowding out, consider, first, the case where the constraint on G binds.
For any symmetric point θ∗M ∈ LR, country A has an incentive to increase segmentation
unilaterally (i.e., increase θ∗A,D) as long as the partial derivative (28) is non-negative,
which can be written as:
θ∗D
Θ
≥ 2θ
∗
T
Θ
∆
Γ
− 5
2
∆
Γ
− 3 −
∆
Γ
− 2
∆
Γ
− 3 . (46)
If ∆
Γ
≥ 2, the condition (46) holds with strict inequality for any θ∗M ∈ LR, so the
Nash equilibrium exhibits full segmentation. By Proposition 6, social optima exhibit zero
segmentation when ∆
Γ
≥ 2 and θ∗G
Θ
≤ 3
8
∆
Γ
−2
∆
Γ
− 3
2
. Hence, equilibrium segmentation is strictly
higher than the social optimum when
θ∗G
Θ
> 3
8
∆
Γ
−2
∆
Γ
− 3
2
.
If ∆
Γ
< 2, define an “ND” curve where condition (46) holds with equality so that
country A has a unilateral incentive to segment. For sufficiently large θ∗T , the ND curve
lies within LR: it intersects with the vertical axis between 0 and −1
2
and passes through
the (1, 1) point in Figure 4. It is easy to see that any point on the ND curve is a maximum
in θ∗A,D given θ
∗
T . Again, excess segmentation is established by the observation that, by
Proposition 6, for ∆
Γ
< 2, the social optimum exhibits zero segmentation. If the G
constraint binds and intersects with the ND curve within LR, then the Nash equilibrium
exhibits partial segmentation.
Next, consider any symmetric Nash equilibrium that has full crowding out and a
non-binding G constraint. To know when the G constraint binds, we calculate country
A’s incentive to inject liquidity unilaterally. Since θ∗ = θTA + θ
T
B, the incentive of an
uncoordinated government to inject liquidity is given by adding up derivatives (29) and
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(31):
∂WA
∂θ∗A,T
+
∂WA
∂θ∗
= Γ
[
(1−ΨA∨B)
(
∆
Γ
− 1
)
+ (ΨA∨B −Ψe)
]
. (47)
Note that the above expression is positive for ΨA∨B = Ψe; hence, each government has
an incentive to crowd out private liquidity. A sufficient condition for (47) to be positive
at any ΨA∨B can be obtained by setting ΨA∨B = 0, which yields ∆Γ ≥ (1 + Ψe). Hence, if
∆
Γ
≥ (1 + Ψe), then the Nash equilibrium must be at the corner where the G constraint
binds. If the social optimum also features a binding G constraint, then the previous
argument applies. If it does not, then we know that the social optimum features zero
segmentation, so the Nash equilibrium can only have (weakly) too much segmentation.
If ∆
Γ
< (1 + Ψe), then we know that the social optimum has zero segmentation, so again,
the Nash equilibrium can only have (weakly) too much segmentation.
Finally, consider any symmetric candidate Nash equilibrium that has partial crowd-
ing out with public segmented liquidity and private free flowing liquidity, i.e., the Nash
equilibrium lies on the Ψe curve. The social incentive to segment along the Ψe curve is
given by differentiating the welfare function, using
∂θ∗A
∂θ∗D
=
∂θ∗B
∂θ∗D
= 1:
dWA
dθ∗D
=
∂WA
∂θ∗A,D
+
∂WA
∂θ∗B,D
+
∂WA
∂θ∗A,T
+ 2
∂θ∗
∂θ∗A,D
∣∣∣∣∣
Ψe=ΨA∨B
∂WA
∂θ∗
.
The government of country A, when it is not coordinated with the government of country
B, (i.e.,
∂θ∗A
∂θ∗D
= 1,
∂θ∗B
∂θ∗D
= 0) increases segmentation as long as
dWA
dθ∗A,D
=
∂WA
∂θ∗A,D
+
∂WA
∂θ∗A,T
+
∂θ∗
∂θ∗A,D
∣∣∣∣∣
Ψe=ΨA∨B
∂WA
∂θ∗
> 0.
Since
∂WA
∂θ∗B,D
+
∂θ∗
∂θ∗A,D
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂WA∂θ∗ < 0,
it follows that dWA
dθ∗A,D
> dWA
dθ∗D
. 2
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